JPRS 76305
26 August 1980

West Europe Report

No. 1814

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

JPRS 76305

26 August 1980

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1614

CONTENTS

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

British Decision on Trident To Affect Other NATO Commitments
(DIE ZEIT, 18 Jul 80) 1

Exact Number, Location of WP Troops Remains Problem for NATO
(DIE ZEIT, 18 Jul 80) 4

FRANCE

Neutron Bomb Seen Calling for New Strategy
(Klaus-Peter Schmid; DIE ZEIT, 11 Jul 80) 6

COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Briefs
French-German Tank Opposed 10

BELGIUM

Chamber Decides on Autonomy for Wallonia, Flanders
(NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 7 Aug 80) 11

CYPRUS

Smuggling Activity Upsurge Reported
(O AGON, 15 Jul 80) 15

FRANCE

Briefs
Ambassador to Tehran 17

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Genscher Rules Out Coalition With CDU/CSU
(DIE WELT, 4 Aug 80) 18

Genscher Strategy To Spotlight Lambsdorff, FDP Conservative Wing
(DER SPIEGEL, 11 Aug 80) 19

Military Security Service Foreknowledge in Bremen Riots Charged
(DER SPIEGEL, 4 Aug 80) 22

ITALY

Cooperatives League Promotes Trade With Eastern Bloc
(Andrea Camanzi; L'UNITA, 9 Jul 80) 24

Port of Ravenna Modernizes To Handle Exports to USSR
(L'UNITA, 9 Jul 80) 27

NORWAY

Former CP-Chairman Larsen Attacks Present Party Course
(Reidar T. Larsen Interview; ARBEIDERBLADET, 18 Jul 80) 30

Armed Forces Hopes for Clarification of Labor Law
(Liv Hegna; AFTENPOSTEN, 18 Jul 80) 32

Airlines' Recession Aids Air Force Pilot Retention
(Stein Morch-Hansen; ARBEIDERBLADET, 17 Jul 80) 34

Briefs
Northern Naval Patrol Gap 36

PORTUGAL

Demographic, Economic Dynamics of Population Studied
(Daniel Amaral; O JORNAL, 25-31 Jul 80) 37

SWEDEN

Mexico's Rules on Crude Oil Exports Pose Problem for Refineries
(Mats Hallgren; DAGENS NYHETER, 11 Aug 80) 49

SWITZERLAND

Zurich Citizens Polled on Youth Riots
(DIE WELTWOCHE, 23 Jul 80) 51

Zurich Official's Position,
Juerg Kaufmann Interview
Riots Not Typical
Citizens Back Authorities,
by Rudolf Baechtold

TURKEY

Secret JP Memo Said To Initiate Election Preparations
(DUNYA, 10 Jun 80) 60

RPP Youth Group Vows to 'Struggle Against Fascism'
(CUMHURIYET, 11 Jun 80) 61

Partisan Politicians Called Real 'Enemies of State'
(Oktay Eksi; HURRIYET, 16 Jul 80) 63

Parties Urged To Unite Against Anarchy
(Oktay Eksi; HURRIYET, 17 Jul 80) 65

Population Shift Said To Threaten Traditional Parties
(Teoman Erel; BUNAYDIN, 16 Jul 80) 67

Coverage of DISK Congress Proceedings
(Various sources, various dates) 70

'YANKI' Report
'AYDINLIK' Report
'TERCUMAN' Commentary

Establishment of Secret NAP Groups in Military Alleged
(Adnan Ozciftci; CUMHURIYET, 10 Jun 80) 78

Danger Seen for Military in 'Sensitive Areas' Plan
(Orsan Oymen; MILLIYET, 12 Jul 80) 80

Briefs
Electronic Equipment Firm Starts Production 83

BRITISH DECISION ON TRIDENT TO AFFECT OTHER NATO COMMITMENTS

Hamburg DEI ZEIT in German 18 Jul p 7

[Text] The meaning of Trident is three-prong and belongs to the mythology of the sea. But now the British Polaris nuclear force is being replaced by American Trident rockets. This is an expression of the unmistakable desire of the present government in London to have a voice in the circle of nuclear nations. It is said that immediately after her election, Mrs Thatcher went to see the command bunker where a British prime minister, in some unreal hour, would be in a position to push the famous--even if very small--button.

It has been known since the beginning of the 1970's that the Polaris force--consisting of 4 submarines with 192 atomic rockets--has lost its power of deterrence. The latest Soviet defense systems surely would not let many of the attacking British projectiles through. The fact that one of the submarines is always being overhauled, usually even a second one, cuts combat preparedness in half. The Heath, Wilson and Callaghan governments made "improvements" on the Polaris rockets--which have not become known until now--costing approximately 4 billion marks, which were listed in the defense budget under headings such as "research" or "development." The House of Commons either slept or chose to remain silent.

Decision Before Recess

The decision to change over had already been made some time ago in the cabinet defense committee. Now the cost is also known: 16 to 20 billion marks, spread over 15 years so as not to exceed 5 percent of the defense budget. This is supposed to sound comforting at a time when measures for economizing in all areas of the nation's life have been decreed.

This decision was announced shortly before summer recess in order to avoid weeks of arguments in the House of Commons and in the media. The government would like to place the next generation of deterrents laconically--the way it announced the stationing of 160,000 American cruise missiles in Berkshire and Cambridgeshire--in the densely populated southeast of England, not in the sparsely settled north of the island. In Britain, decisions regarding defense are not up to those who are being defended.

But not all defenders believe that the Trident system is the wisest choice. Doubts have been voiced in the London "Institute for Strategic Studies" whether it can be obtained for the sums named. Some 25 billion marks are considered to be a more plausible figure. This leads to the question of what else will be sacrificed in the defense budget. Or: can Great Britain afford such expensive deterrence and at the same time fulfill its other NATO obligations?

The army must comply with its duties as the Army of the Rhine (BAOR). The air force must secure the largest national air space within NATO, all around the long coastline of the Eastern Atlantic. Will the four, or maximally five, new nuclear boats and their rockets be at the expense of all other weapons systems and the purpose they serve? Is this not a high price to pay for the increased accuracy of Trident as opposed to Polaris: England's reduced capacity in a conventional war?

It can hardly be assumed that Mrs Thatcher will get the Trident from Carter or Reagan in 1982 at the same special price assured MacMillan by Kennedy 20 years ago. And, considering the secrecy surrounding questions of defense, it is also improbable that this givernment should be trusted when it quotes numbers. During a recession, a large armament project consumes an ever larger percentage of the gross national product than it does during normal times. With an inflation rate of 22 percent, no estimate will be accurate. This is true, for example, for the production of those 300 new Challenger tanks and the 1,000 MCV-80-APC's, for which a contract for 5.2 billion marks has been signed. Produced in the country, they will, as the defense ministry assured, provide work for thousands.

But this announcement is supposed to calm primarily the European allies, expecially the Germans paying for England's European community contribution, rather than their own labor unions. Because this Challenger, although faster than the Chieftain tank, is by no means the most modern tank available. But it does make it possible to make good on the large contract which was lost when the Ayatollah Khomeyni annulled a billion-mark contract of the dethroned Shah. The "Shir-2" model aimed at then has developed, as it is put, into the Challenger. It is to be introduced to the BAOR in 1985. It will receive an additional mechanized regiment, the rearmed Chieftains, which had lost their artillery men and drivers years ago. Now, with British unemployment higher than it has been since 1930, the volunteer army no longer has any recruiting problems.

Warned by some strong political statements by the Thatcher government which were merely an effort to cover up weakness with public relations jargon--e.g. Olympics and Iran boycotts--one must examine the new armament plans very carefully. London now squanders five times as much money on its nuclear miniprestige than on improving its role as codefender of Continental Europe.

With Cheap Warheads

The "MTB 80"-type tank would be better than the Challenger, but is too expensive. It would be best to equip the Trident rockets with the same warheads used by the Americans. But the SUNDAY TIMES reported weeks ago, and defense minister Pym confirmed on Tuesday, that Chevaline-type "cheap warheads" made in Britain will be mounted. Here, too, the economic situation is more important than the military requirements. One can read in American military publications what British taxpayers are not told, namely that the cheaper version of the warhead of the British Trident rocket carries only approximately one-fifth of the destructive power than the American model has. Who is being deterred from what? Will the attacked enemy strike back with only 20 percent of its potential?

9328
CSO: 3103

EXACT NUMBER, LOCATION OF WP TROOPS REMAINS PROBLEM FOR NATO

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 18 Jul 80 p 7

[Text] Already a few days before the chancellor's Moscow talks, there were certain indications in Vienna of a new Eastern initiative in the force reduction negotiations in Central Europe (MBFR). In effect until then was what Leonid Brezhnev, Soviet party and government chief, had announced on 6 October 1979 in East Berlin: the unilateral, voluntary (and thus not binding on a future agreement) withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet military personnel and 1,000 tanks within 1 year. Now an additional reduction was officially put on record.

The latest Russian move in the force reduction, which Brezhnev announced during his talks with the chancellor, came as a surprise to the West because the 20,000 Russian soldiers with their 1,000 tanks, which had been withdrawn last fall, were not included in the new overture. However, the West does not even know where they have actually disappeared to.

The new Eastern proposal to withdraw 20,000 Russians, in addition to the 20,000 already withdrawn unilaterally, as opposed to 13,000 Americans, is to facilitate creating a first partial agreement about Soviet and American force reductions. At the beginning of the year, the NATO states had proposed the withdrawal of 33,000 Russian soldiers for the withdrawal of 13,000 American soldiers for such an agreement. Apparently the reduction is to be carried out as a symmetrical operation, as the East has suggested several times since 1976 in Vienna--on both sides in accordance with the strength alleged by Moscow: an almost equal number of soldiers is withdrawn on each side; the difference of barely one-third in favor of the West is apparently supposed to reflect the balance of strength as Moscow sees it.

This Russian intention angered the NATO people in Brussels as well as the Western delegates in Vienna, because the Soviets stick by their own numbers regarding their forces (which are false according to clarified, constantly monitored and confirmed Western judgment). Thus the withdrawl of a total of 40,000 men (20,000 voluntarily, 20,000 against 13,000 Americans) would no longer mean a reduction of the unknown number of Russian ground forces in Central Europe--in 1977/78 it was estimated by NATO to be at least 40,000.

NATO attributes to the Soviets a total of 476,000 ground forces in Central Europe (including the air defense troops which have since been excluded by the Eastern side; according to NATO reconnaissance, approximately 366,000 are in the GDR, 73,000 in Czechoslovakia and 37,000 in Poland. Among the

805,000 which the WP has stated since 1976 for its ground forces in this area, the 105,000 GDR soldiers (army only) are undisputed. Of the remaining 700,000 men, NATO has until now attributed 230,000 to Poland, 151,000 to Czechoslovakia, but both nations have consistently refuted these numbers as being much too high (Poland has meanwhile accounted for 14,000 additional soldiers and has thus reduced the discrepancy accordingly). But there remained between 40,000 and 60,000 Soviet soldiers to be found or to be explained away. The rule: the more the Poles and Czechs add in their revised numbers, the more the obscure Russian number shrinks in the discrepancy of a total of 157,000 between Eastern allegations and Western calculations.

As long as the Soviets, when comparing data, cannot prove in detail that they have at least 40,000 men less than NATO attributes to them, the Russian proposals and unilateral force reductions merely obliterate the difference between East and West and the unexplained data basis. The basis for an agreement does not become any clearer that way.

This game of confusion irritates the NATO experts for force reduction as well as the military reconnaissance divisions of the Western NATO headquarters, especially since at this time nobody at the alliance headquarters knows the exact whereabouts of the sixth mechanized division of the Soviet Army from the Wittenberg garrison, which was withdrawn last year with great publicity. The national military representatives of the NATO military committee had just declared at a Brussels conference that this is a defiency in Western reconnaissance and a warning signal for serious verification problems of force reductions, when the new Russian proposal was presented in Vienna.

A second shock for NATO was the German report to the allies about Schmidt's and Genscher's Moscow talks with Soviet military leaders under the direction of Defense Minister Ustinov and Chief of Staff Orgakov. The Russians surprised the Germans with the question of why NATO, when dealing with a total number of 700,000, stubbornly argues about a mere 12,000 to 13,000 Soviet soldiers, which were the subject of the arguments in Vienna. To the chancellor's response that it was a matter of a discrepancy of approximately 150,000 men, Ustinov and Orgakov gave the impression that they did not understand the entire Western calculation and argumentation.

After 7 long years of negotiations and 4 years of discussions about data, the question arises for NATO experts, just how far the Soviet military leadership's interest in the negotiations goes, and whether the Soviets are prepared to negotiate about an accountable and practical agreement for the reduction of known strike forces in a limited area in order to arrive at an approximate balance (700,000 men each).

Moscow's proposals and announcements since October 1979 combine to an effective show of good will, but are not yet an objective basis for an agreement.

9328
CSO: 3103

NEUTRON BOMB SEEN CALLING FOR NEW STRATEGY

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 11 Jul 80 p 6

[Article by Klaus Peter Schmid: "Interest in the Neutron Bomb Causes Deterrence To Falter"]

[Text] Paris, July--When French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing invites the press to the Elysee he is concerned only marginally with answering journalists' questions. Inevitably, his main interest is to get a message to the people--two or three pregnant sentences which the media subsequently dissect and examine according to all the rules of the game.

During his most recent press conference, his ninth, the president's key sentences were: "As regards the neutron bomb, I decided in the Defense Council in December 1976 to order studies concerning its construction. The studies have led to preparations for the weapon. The first tests have taken place. The decision as to construction of the weapon can be made beginning in 1982/3."

The information represents more than a mere announcement that France in all probability is considering the addition of a new weapon to its deadly arsenal. It is, for the time being, the conclusion of a lively and public debate concerning the striking power and credibility of France's deterrent force. Giscard is venturing onto new ground now that France's nuclear potential is regarded as a fact with which the allies and the population are living. All political forces, including the communists, these days accept the idea of national atomic defense as long as actual disarmament remains an illusion.

The president reinforced his announcement with a meaningful sentence: "One cannot accept a dead-end-street in the field of defense." This can only mean that Paris intends to continue unswervingly on its present course of independent defense despite limited financial possibilities and despite

limited financial possibilities and despite world political upheavals. Speculation that France might consider a return to the NATO military pact are thus again debunked as being on the wrong track. French strategy relies solely on the deterrence represented by the arsenal which is its alone and which stands at its disposal without limitation. This nuclear potential has been doubled in the past 3 years, according to official assurances. The neutron bomb would be an additional element to make the "force de dissuasion," the deterrent force even more credible in the tactical field.

Credibility is the key word in the present defense debate on the Seine. Giscard has made it unequivocally clear: "Any nuclear attack on French territory would automatically result in a strategic nuclear response." With this, the president simulaneously reacted to the urgent remonstrances of his political friends and allies. Centrists as well as Gaullists have been demanding increased security efforts. The general staff (like the Centrists) has strongly supported construction of a French neutron bomb. Even the Socialists could soon join in this demand.

If France one day is to own this new weapon, which makes localized use possible, it will have to further develop its strategy. Ever since de Gaulle in the early 1960's officially ordered construction of the atom bomb, the principle has prevailed that France will secure its sovereign territory through atomic retaliation but that it will not employ its potential in open battle in the field. The Plateau d'Albion, in Provence, which today holds 18 launch-ready missiles with a range of more than 3,000 kilometers, is a symbol of this strategy. On the other hand, the strike could come from one of the five atomic submarines that are cruising the oceans as mobile launching site (perhaps for the destruction of Russian cities) are the 37 strategic bombers of the type Mirage IV, with a maximum action range of 2,500 kilometers. The tactical atomic weapons (such as the 30 plutonium missiles stationed on the eastern border) would in earnest serve merely to deliver a gradual retaliation, a "warning shot," intended to demonstrate the determination to escalate.

The neutron bomb is difficult to fit into this concept. It is neither part of the direct deterrent nor part of gradual retaliation. Opponents of the new weapon were thus not wrong in pointing out that the weapon's introduction would have to nourish doubts as to whether France would commit the great counterstrike in earnest. The neutron bomb would be used in a battle which, according to the classic Gaullist concept, must not take place.

Giscard has discounted this objection. His terse explanation: "In our deliberations concerning the use of this weapon we will take into account the fact that France is directly affected by the security of its European neighbors." The neutron bomb makes sense not only for the defense of

France's own borders but also for those of its neighbors (primarily the FRG). In so saying, the president did not pin himself down precisely. But he did reinforce earlier indications that France's potential can also be used outside French sovereign territory. When the chief of the general staff, Guy Mery, first advocated such a limited advance strategy in 1976, requiring the use of tactical atomic weapons perhaps even on Germany's eastern border, he provoked a storm of indignation. Today, this eventuality no longer seems to be so shocking.

Giscard, meanwhile, has reacted to a further development; the pillar of deterrence has developed cracks, since the missile silos of Albion are within range of the Russian SS-20 missiles stationed in the nations of the Warsaw Pact. In addition, the Mirage IV has been overtaken by development and actually is to be replaced beginning in 1985. Finally, it seems that five missile submarines are insufficient, particularly since only three of them can be ready for action at any one time. France thus will make special efforts in this strategic field to develop mobile launching sites such as the Americans and the Soviets are building already.

The technicians are still discussing whether these launchers, names SX and mounted on tracked vehicles, are to be equipped with single or multiple warheads. But the range of about 4,000 kilometers is as firm as is the goal of the system, that is, to be ready for deployment in 1992: To escape destruction by the enemy, the SX will constantly change its position--at least during times of crisis--without diminishing its striking power. The SX thus would be a reinforcement of the submarine weapon, which itself is to be rearmed with multiple warheads in 4 or 5 years.

The last word does not seem to have been spoken regarding the question of how many submarines France's otherwise shrinking navy is to obtain. The Gaullists recently demanded no fewer than 10 by the year 2010 (only six are envisaged so far.) To finance these, according to Gaullist ideas, would require increasing the defense part of the gross national product from the present 3.3 percent to 4 percent. The fate of the aging Mirage IV, too, has not been decided since no equivalent successor is available. The Mirage 4000, which has been tested since 1979, appears to offer no basic improvements (such as range).

Giscard also spoke frankly as regards the question of conventional forces. Here the draft has been the subject of discussion for years, since only professional soldiers are capable of dealing with the growing technical demands. The Gaullists have even suggested reduction of the present year of compulsory service to 3 months. However, the president has no taste for this: "In view of the insecurity of the world political situation, the recommendation for reducing the term of compulsory service would be interpreted as a French surrender or abdication."

Giscard has never left any doubt that a professional army would be an army "humanly separated from the nation." It was years ago that he declared on television: "The security of a nation must involve its entire population." Today, the population is not alone in living with the bomb without complaint. Officers and simple recruits, who not long ago complained bitterly about poor material situations and the lack of social integration, no longer give any sign of displeasure. Calm seems to have come to the barracks. This, too, is an indispensable precondition for defense policy, as Giscard says, not getting into a dead-end-street.

9687
CSO: 3103

BRIEFS

FRENCH-GERMAN TANK OPPOSED--The plan to build jointly a French-German tank has gotten off to a rather bad start. The plan was launched 6 months ago during a French-German summit meeting. However, there are two major obstacles in its way: The German parliamentarians who do not see what use it would be--these parliamentarians are advancing arguments put forward by the soldiers who do not favor this tank either. They say simply that it will cost much too much, practically double the cost of a tank made entirely in Germany. This is why the parliamentary commission on defense has just asked for the project to be postponed until a bit more is known about it. Anyway, it is said that if this tank ever comes into existence it will be called Napoleon I. [Text] [LD061056 Paris Domestic Service in French 0900 GMT 6 Aug 80]

CSO: 3100

CHAMBER DECIDES ON AUTONOMY FOR WALLONIA, FLANDERS

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 7 Aug 80 p 1

[Report by "pmr": "Autonomy for Wallonia and Flanders--Belgian State Reform Approved--No Solution for Brussels As Yet"]

[Text] Brussels, 5 August--At 0500 Tuesday [5 August] the Belgian Chamber of Representatives passed the constitutional amendments needed for a state reform. Belgium is thus being divided into two regions, Flanders and Wallonia, with their own parliament, their own government, receiving funds of their own and being in a position to make autonomous decisions in certain economic and area-planning decisions. The implementing legislation for these constitutional amendments has yet to be approved by the second chamber of parliament, the Senate, however.

Division Into Three Parts

It is on this implementing legislation that the work of reform foundered 10 years ago, when the division of Belgium into three regions--Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels--was first anchored in the constitution. This time this danger appears to have been avoided, however. The implementing legislation was passed by the Chamber of Representatives already on Sunday [3 August] morning. The vote in the Senate, expected by Friday of this week [8 August], is now considered merely a matter of form, for in the legislative marathon the Belgian bicameral system was forced by the overwhelming government majority to adopt a complete division of labor.

While the Senate, in committee meetings and floor debates, for a start prepared and passed the constitutional amendment, the Chamber of Representatives at the same time dealt with the implementing legislation. Then the two chambers exchanged legislative drafts. In order not to allow the laborious procedure to go around in circles and to avoid a further postponement of the summer recess, which normally begins in July, the government saw to it Argus-eyed that not a single word of the texts was changed in the second readings. The Chamber of Representatives was not even allowed to correct flaws in the language or mistakes in punctuation of the draft that had been passed by the Senate lest a referral

back to the Senate be required and the whole procedure be started all over again. The numerically extremely meager opposition of 35 of 212 representatives and 28 of 181 senators from four language parties and the Communists, with hundreds of proposals for amendments, were able to delay but unable to stop the procedure. In the last couple of weeks the members of parliament debated around the clock 7 days a week. A committee meeting lasting 27 hours without interruption beat all Belgian parliamentary records.

Impatient Walloons

The connection between the state reform and the budget bill for the current year is cited as an explanation for this incredible tour de force. After innumerable unsuccessful starts, the Walloons--particularly the Socialists--had become suspicious and firmly resolved to block the current budget until the hesitant Flemings at long last conceded to them their dearly longed-for regional autonomy. But probably the fragile work of reform, marked by endless crises and intense language fights, did not really have a chance of being adopted by the members of parliament anyway except in a state of utter physical exhaustion. Even after oratory battles lasting 20 hours, the stubborn senators of the Flemish Christian People's Union or of Brussels representatives of the government parties still offered some resistance to the distasteful and faulty legislation. Some members of parliament of the government parties were also regularly among those abstaining or voting against the legislation. "The texts are bad, and everyone knows that they were knocked together in great confusion," said one Christian Democratic senator summarizing the mood; "I will vote yes, nevertheless, in order at long last to free the country from this regional obsession."

Finances of Regional Bodies

There is no solid hope, however, that Belgium will again attain greater political stability after this state reform is passed and that the government will again be able to deal seriously with the economic and social problems. The reform now passed ignores the hottest potato--the problem of the two-language capital of Brussels and of the other municipalities with language minorities. In the next parliamentary elections, no later than December 1982, only Flanders and Wallonia will get their own regional assembly and an administration appointed by it. Like the already existing assemblies for the Dutch and the French cultural communities, the regional assemblies can pass decrees enjoying the force of law. As of 1982, in addition to allocations by the central government, they will receive their own income from radio and television fees, automobile taxes, gambling and liquor licenses and real estate and inheritance taxes and be able to float loans. For their own taxes the regions will also later be able to fix differing assessment rates. The central allocations will amount to 39 billion Belgian francs for the two

regions in the first year, and 47 billion for the two cultural communities. At the regional level they will be distributed one-third to Flanders and one-third to Wallonia in accordance with the population, the area and the amount of income tax. This formula contains a certain financial adjustment--of about 3 or 4 billion Belgian francs--in favor of the economically weaker Wallonia and was, therefore, violently attacked by the Flemish opposition. The cultural allocations go to the Flemish and the Francophone communities at a rate of 55 percent and 45 percent respectively. The authorities of the cultural communities have been expanded by adding so-called personnel-related affairs such as health care, protection of juveniles and care for the aged and handicapped. Education remains under national supervision, however. On the Flemish side, the institutions of the region and of the cultural community are amalgamated. On the Francophone side, because of the relatively high proportion of about 700,000 Francophone inhabitants of Brussels in addition to the 3.2 million Walloons in the French cultural community, there will be two separate organizations.

In the hurry that was necessary at the time, the partners of the mammoth coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals formed in May of this year were unable to get together on a solution for the capital of Brussels, inhabited by an estimated 700,000 Francophones, 150,000 Flemings and 200,000 foreigners. Also still pending are the future role of the Senate and the provinces as well as the statute of the German-language community consisting of about 50,000 inhabitants of the eastern districts and the communities with language minorities, which will remain under national administrative supervision for the time being. According to a government promise, a solution for Brussels is to be found by 1982. But the position of the Flemings, who want to tolerate Brussels merely as a capital area in addition to the two regions of Flanders and Wallonia, and that of the Francophones, who are demanding a full-fledged third region, continue to clash with undiminished force, and the chances of a quick solution are, therefore, viewed with great skepticism. Besides, time appears to be working in favor of the Flemings now that a bipartite regionalization is being passed.

Success for Head of Government

The indefatigable prime minister, Wilfred Martens, who after 10 years of almost constant government crises has managed something of a miracle--though an imperfect one--in the state reform is firmly resolved despite all misgivings also to tackle the Gordian knot of Brussels this fall. While no one doubts his honest and intrepid effort, there is doubt as to whether his giant coalition will continue. The taunts and skirmishing among the three big majority groupings daily fill whole newspaper columns. Particularly the Flemish Socialists strongly criticize the Liberals and the Christian Democrats. The obstacle of the state reform having been hurdled, the ideological contrasts in urgent economic and social questions are again becoming more prominent. The most important stumbling blocks are considered to be the 1981 draft budget and the social security

reform, both of which require drastic economies, and the decision about the stationing of new medium-range weapons in the NATO alliance, which Belgium has been postponing since last December. Whether Socialists or Liberals will leave the government ship in the expected autumn storms is a question that is quite open as yet. After finishing the state reform, which required a two-thirds majority, both a center-right and a center-left government would be quite viable--provided that the Brussels problem is tabled.

8790
CSO: 3103

SMUGGLING ACTIVITY UPSURGE REPORTED

Nicosia O ADOM in Greek 15 Jul 80 p 5

[Text] Due to its geographic location, Cyprus tends to become a gathering place for international smugglers and other crooks. This is reported in a statement issued by the Public Information Office published yesterday on the occasion of a visit to the Interior Ministry by the president of the Republic. The published statement contains an extensive analysis of the police objectives and mission and underlines, in part:

The Cyprus Police Force cooperates closely with the Interpol in combatting international crime and its contribution in this effort is appreciated and recognized. In this regard, the cooperation and vigilance of the Cypriot police have contributed many times to the detection and arrest of drug traffickers. One recent case is that of the ship "Total" with 5 tons of opium gum. The information which led to the capture of the vessel was passed on by the Cypriot police.

Especially in the war against the international smuggling--due to its geographic location, Cyprus tends to become a gathering place for international smugglers and other crooks--the contribution of the Harbor Police, which this year has been strengthened by the two boats, "Kimon" and "Afroditi," has been significant. The acquisition of these two modern vessels enables the Harbor Police to carry out more effectively its difficult and serious task.

Another serious problem facing the Cypriot police is that of serious crimes committed by foreigners trying to solve their political disputes. To avert and prevent such crimes there is strict and systematic surveillance of those who come and stay in Cyprus.

Another important task of the police is to guard and take security measures to protect important foreign visitors, diplomats, foreign officials and other visitors who come to Cyprus to participate in international conferences or other events.

With regard to common crimes, the situation in Cyprus is not disquieting and such crimes are under effective control both in terms of prevention

as well as detection. To further reduce and contain common crimes we are making adjustments in the policing system and by closely following the progress made in the crime detection and forensic sector. Part of this effort is the training of police officers and experts abroad.

The use of narcotics especially among Cypriots is very limited and for the time being there is no reason for worry. The surveillance measures implemented by the police together with the dislike of the Cypriot people for narcotics make such a possibility even more remote. Especially strict is the control of aliens and for this purpose the Cypriot police cooperate and keep in close contact with five police forces in other countries through the Interpol.

Another serious problem facing the police especially since the Turkish invasion is that of traffic control which becomes increasingly more acute due to the reduction in the number of highways and the increase of vehicles. On the basis of statistical data Cyprus is among the small number of countries which have a large number of vehicles compared to the population. In Cyprus the ratio is 1 to 4. To deal with this problem and reduce the number of accidents /the police/ have patrol cars and check points on the highways and offer advice to drivers both in the field as well as over the radio and denounce violators.

The Cypriot Police Force has this goal and objective:

a. To continue the efforts for further improving the force in terms of quality, organization and manpower strength to be able to perform more effectively its tasks;

b. To serve the people better by readjusting and modernizing its police machinery.

In this context, and from the point of view of organizational structure, a significant development is the creation of the Motorized Unit for Instant Action which is designed to combat organized crime and organized violence.

To succeed in these tasks, the police need, above all, the cooperation of the public. For this reason and for cultivating and maintaining good relations with the public as well as for their continuing improvement, the police are making every possible effort. In this regard, the Public Relations Section plays an important role in educating and informing the public and the press on police matters and organizing social and other events which further contribute to strengthening the contacts and relations between the public and the police.

7520
CSO:4908

BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR TO TEHRAN--Guy Georgy, chief of the African and Malagasy Affairs Office at the Quai d'Orsay, will be appointed ambassador of France to Tehran, replacing Raoul Delaye who will be sent to represent France in Madrid. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 11 Aug 80 p 35]

CSO: 3100

GENSCHER RULES OUT COALITION WITH CDU/CSU

Bonn DIE WELT in German 4 Aug 80 p 2

[Report: "Genscher 'Quite Sure' That He Will Not Form a Coalition With the CDU/CSU"]

[Text] Salzburg (DPA/rtr)--FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on Austrian Television (ORF) yesterday definitely rejected the CDU and CSU as possible coalition partners after the Bundestag elections. In the program "Press Hour," he told Swiss and Austrian correspondents that there was no pressing need to cancel the coalition with the SPD. In that respect, he said, he was "quite sure" that "nothing will happen" on election night, 5 October. It was the election aim of his party "with a strengthened FDP to continue the previous policy" together with "a strong SPD and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt."

Discussing the decision to boycott the summer Olympics, Genscher said he sympathized with the German athletes' disappointment at not being able to go to Moscow, but there also had to be "a feeling of bitterness about that step not meeting with greater support in Europe."

Genscher defended the common foreign policy of the EEC countries. At the same time he rejected the supposition that Bonn was striving to loosen relations with these countries. In his opinion Europe is now in a better position "to speak with one voice." A constructive dynamic policy, he said, is increasing unity. The United States was continuing to be the gurantor of European security, however. The foreign minister said: "As Europeans, we must realize that we can preserve the balance that is vital for our security only with the United States. I have no doubt but that that will also be the case in the future."

8790
CSO: 3103

GENSCHER STRATEGY TO SPOTLIGHT LAMBSDORFF, FDP CONSERVATIVE WING

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 11 Aug 80 p 19

/Article: "New Tack--FDP Chief Genscher Has Changed His Party's Election Campaign Strategy--at the Expense of Minister of Interior Baum"/

/Text/ In somber tones, FDP chief Hans-Dietrich Genscher talked last week of the "toughest election campaign in the history" of the Free Democrats. By election Sunday, 5 October, the Liberals plan to drum it into the citizens' heads that "this time," as 2.5 million posters are going to proclaim, "everything" is at stake--that is, the parliamentary existence of the FDP.

Internally, however, the mood after the devastating election defeat in North Rhine-Westphalia is much happier again than one would surmise from all the doomsday talk. Utterly delighted, the top Liberals gloat over having stolen the show from their big competitors in the middle of the silly season. Economics Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff has moved up to the starring role in the Liberal summer theater.

For weeks now Lambsdorff has used every opportunity to pick a fight with Social Democrats and trade unionists.

He predicted the "ruin of our free market system" if "the concepts of the trade unions were all allowed to become reality." The SPD election platform too, he declared theatrically, "in the last analysis" amounts to "elimination of our economic system."

Because of the dispu. with the SPD concerning codetermination at Mannesmann in the coal and steel industry, he saw "storm clouds on the eve of the new legislature" and warned that the FDP could also go a different way. "I am no born coalition partner of the Social Democrats," Lambsdorff said.

From Japan the minister returned with the realization that the workers--in other words, the core of the SPD electorate--were to blame for the economy's export difficulties; they had to work harder.

Finding the aphorist to be "topnotch," the FDP chief without delay named him the "Ludwig Erhard of the eighties." He was delighted to hear the Christian Democrats protest this comparison with the father of the economic miracle, thus continuing to keep Lambsdorff in the news. "They really fell for it," says Genscher, slapping his thigh.

What Genscher is celebrating as a coup is in fact a sharp change of course in election campaign strategy, possibly even a change in FDP policy.

As recently as at the party congress in Freiburg in June, the chairman had conjured up the "spirit" of earlier times when the FDP was still a party of reform with a definite program. He said then it needed a "definite shape" again and had to prove itself as the guardian of a constitutional state. As a representative of that line, he extolled the federal minister of the interior, Gerhart Baum.

After only a couple of months, there is hardly anything left of that concept, or any mention of a program any longer. In fact, the name of Baum did not occur to the chairman at all when he presented his election campaign challenge. The minister of the interior was removed from the limelight of the "all-star band" (Genscher's term).

The greater the risk of a new terrorist attack appears to be, the greater is Genscher's fear lest Baum, who has done what he could to curtail police authority, be blamed for it.

His advice to Baum is that he should now appear more often in the company of BKA /Federal Criminal Police Bureau/ chief Horst Herold and make it a point to visit police stations. "When I was minister of the interior, I too inspected every rubber truncheon personally," says Genscher.

The FDP chairman would have been only too glad to remodel his party colleague in a jiffy into a guardian of law and order, for he thinks that with his liberal policies Baum deters the very voters whom Genscher wants to lure over to his side--the vacillating ones in the CDU/CSU camp. With his attitude Baum is disturbing the flight of decoy Lambsdorff.

The head of the Liberals has learned from the latest polls that 25 percent of the voters this time are toying with the idea of giving their second vote to the FDP.

More than 70 percent of them thus want to insure the FDP's survival--SPD supporters because they fear the influence of the leftists in case their party gets an absolute majority, and CDU/CSU supporters because they reject Franz Josef Strauss or because they do not believe that the Bavarian will win and therefore at least want to strengthen the FDP's position in the coalition.

The Social Democrats are pleased to note that Genscher, following such poll results, has changed his strategy and now, with Lambsdorff, is trying to break into the territory of the Conservatives. Prying voters loose there, "and not from the Social Democrats," Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt says approvingly, is a "very correctly perceived task."

In the FDP, however, the new Genscher tack is not gaining universal applause by any means. Minister of the Interior Baum, bothered about supposedly not being able to show off his liberal policies any longer, talks about "those chicken-hearted people."

While realizing that the Liberals have to do some poaching among the CDU/CSU, Baum's liberal-left friends have a foreboding that Lambsdorff, behind Genscher, is being presented as the party's trademark. The chairman has already stated this, saying: "The whole FDP is behind him."

The skeptics object that if the party is solely identified with an economics minister who, as has been stated, as the "Erhard of the eighties," represents CDU policies, other potential voters--from the SPD-FDP camp--might be repelled.

"And they," says Baum, "still represent our greatest potential."

8790
CSO: 3103

MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE FOREKNOWLEDGE IN BREMEN RIOTS CHARGED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 4 Aug 80 p 21

[Text] The Military Security Service (MAD) had foreknowledge of the Bremen demonstration against the swearing-in of recruits: A MAD operator is a member of the Communist League of West Germany.

The Military Security Service was always at hand. Not only did it provide counterintelligence, it actually incited mischief.

However, Bremen Mayor Hans Koschnick failed last week in his challenge to the CDU/CSU defense committee finally to name the source of their assertion that Bremen Young Socialists and communists worked hand in hand against the Bundeswehr and had allied themselves in a kind of popular front for the Bremen riots of 6 May last.

CDU politician Manfred Woerner who heads the Bonn investigation as part of the pre-election campaign curtly rejected Koschnick's request: The committee had unanimously decided, he said, to fully protect its sources of information.

By now even some Union Christians are doubtful whether this decision can long be upheld. For its reports from the Bremen youth organizations which intended to demonstrate against the swearing-in ceremony for recruits in the Weser Stadium, MAD relied on an informant who appears all too suspect. Moreover, the reports often flatly contradict the findings of the Bremen Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

The MAD informant and member of the Communist League of West Germany (KBW), himself drafted as an armored infantryman, was certainly more than a witness to the alleged talks. Whenever the opportunity arose at youth group meetings, he called for acts of violence against the Bundeswehr ceremony. That fact, however, he failed to report to his officer contact in Hannover.

Nor did he stick to the truth in other matters. The KBW, for example, had not been invited to the Juso [Young Socialist] meeting on 18 April last, when the demonstration was discussed, though "the source"--to quote the committee paraphrase--had claimed otherwise.

The MAD-KBW agent had simply gatecrashed the Jusos office, hoping not to be ejected.

Once there he was in fact allowed to stay. However, when he again called for violence in the course of the discussion, the Jusos got really angry. Somewhat subdued he said in his subsequent report to MAD: "The Jusos rejected any involvement in KBW actions."

To this day the Bremen security authorities cannot understand how the bloody riots came to erupt in Bremen on 6 May last. Bremen's Interior Senator Helmut Froehlich said to the Bonn Committee: "This is the first time ever that we in Bremen have witnessed such an event."

Up to the last moment the senator and his police officials hoped to be able to keep the demonstration in check. They did expect some brawls but certainly not bloody riots.

True, the military counterintelligence people and the civilian officials from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution had given some warning. The Bremen authorities, though, had quite valid reasons for their contrary assumption: Not a single violent conflict with the police had occurred at the 30 meetings organized by the militant Bremen KBW in 1979.

Equally bewildered was Youth Senator Herming Scherf who, with the foreknowledge of his mayor and police president, went to the Weser Stadium on the evening of the riot to serve as a mediator "between the fronts" in case of police-demonstrator clashes.

When there was nothing left to save, when stones flew and cars burned, Scherf--discouraged--left the battlefield and visited a friend in a nearby apartment. Scherf explained to the committee: "I could not stand any more. I was through."

The Union accuses Koschnick and the authorities, saying that they should simply have banned the demonstration before it ever took place. In fact the Social Democrats are able to counter this accusation by referring to the highest authority: When Federal President Karl Carstens, the principal speaker at the swearing-in ceremony, was advised (while still in Bonn) that demonstrations against the Bundeswehr and the president were to be expected in Bremen, he rejected the suggestion to cancel the celebration or transfer it to some military terrain.

By the intermediary of his State Secretary Hans Neusel he informed Bremen State Councilor Erwin Weiss on 28 April that "the federal president is most concerned that anything should be avoided which might result in the use of violence against peaceful demonstrators."

11698
CSO: 3103

COOPERATIVES LEAGUE PROMOTES TRADE WITH EASTERN BLOC

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 9 Jul 80 p 19

[Article by Andrea Camanni: "United, To Create the New Economic Order"]

> There is one exporter to the East that takes care not only of its own interests but also those of other companies: the Cooperatives League. There is a basic limitation, however: the lack of an Italian strategy for the problems related to development.

During 1979 trade by the cooperatives associated with the League suffered--as was inevitable--from the burden of overall political relations and from the continuation of the basic structural problems of East-West trade.

Nonetheless, the statistics reflect substantially positive progress: more than 35 billion in direct sales and 120 billion in sales stimulated in behalf of small and medium-sized enterprises and enterprises with state participation (a ratio of 1 to 4 between direct sales and stimulated sales). Each billion in exports of products and technology is utilized to foster the export of fully 4 billion in products of the other entrepreneurial sectors.

Here we have the political significance, translated into figures, of the organizational system that the League has created for foreign trade. Our commitment to economic, technical and scientific cooperation between East and West goes beyond commercial and sectorial interests, and the facts bear this out. No other entrepreneurial sector--not even State Participations--can present a balance sheet that so extensively favors the broad spectrum of enterprises.

Beyond question, however, the political commitment alone is not sufficient. In the past few months we have witnessed the revival of a debate that is sterile and at times contrived: Should one develop, or not develop, the policy of cooperation with Eastern Europe? Only a few political elements associated with a conception which is subordinate to the interests of the most reactionary forces on the world scene have been able to entertain a debate stated in such terms.

The world of big business--including Agnelli and Confindustria [General Confederation of Italian Industry]--and the world of cooperative enterprises and small and medium business seem to have rejected a similar dilemma decisively.

In truth, it is not a "yes" or "no" type of problem. It is a problem of defining the content--defining the quality--of a policy of cooperation with the East. How to cooperate, and with what means and what aims--that is the real problem. What is needed is a credible and viable strategy that will chart the course t a solution of the political tensions which have inevitably called into question the existing world economic order. In this context, moreover, it is necessary to revise the technical, legal and economic instrumentation that lies at the base of the existing economic order and increasingly shows itself to be incapable of releasing the energy necessary to construct the new economic order.

Let us point to one small example in the technical area. The quota for imports from the socialist countries--which is operative at the level of the European Community--cannot continue to be established on the basis of the value of the merchandise in question, for this means that each year the quotas are reduced 20 percent by inflation in the absence of any automatic mechanism for reestablishing them. Under these conditions it is difficult to refrain from putting protectionist policies into effect. All that is necessary is to change the criterion for establishing the quotas, basing them not on value but on quantity, or to introduce mechanisms for effecting automatic adjustments based on the average rate of inflation.

We are of the opinion, however, that technical devices of this type do not completely solve the problem.

Indeed, how is it possible today to solve problems relating to the restoration of equilibrium between the great underdeveloped and developed areas of the world without the contribution of the socialist countries? Frequently (and even among leftist circles) people speak of a "new world economic order" as a problem of the people's and democratic forces of the developed capitalist world. We believe that an effective policy of international cooperation cannot succeed without the political and economic involvement of the socialist bloc. This almost one-third of all mankind must inevitably be directly associated with the great historic struggle for the restoration of equilibrium between these great areas of the world.

Supersession of the policy of blocs, and the development of international economic cooperation and detente, are processes that operate within the framework of relations between the capitalist and socialist industrialized countries, on the one hand, and the developing countries on the other.

The West (and Italy above all) must therefore know how to propose such a strategy to the socialist countries. This means, however, that one must operate openly, without prior exclusions or preconceived judgments and

without preconceived suspicions. The net transfer of wealth from the industrialized countries to the developing countries cannot continue to be made within a framework of competition between one group of countries and the other, as though the fact that a given plant in Angola is American rather than Soviet (when in the end it may be that neither of the two will work) could decisively affect the situation with respect to world political hegemony.

We believe that the bases now exist for a shift toward a policy of finalizing and unifying the efforts in behalf of projects of objective benefit to the economy for which they are designed. Concerning these matters, the cooperative movement associated with the League has made working proposals to all Italian economic groups and primarily to the small business and handicrafts sectors. It is necessary for the government to take responsibility--within the scope of its jurisdiction--to encourage the choice of a new strategy and assist in its implementation.

10[illegible]
CSO: 3104

PORT OF RAVENNA MODERNIZES TO HANDLE EXPORTS TO USSR

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 9 Jul 80 p 19

[Article: "Ravenna: An Expanding Port That Faces the East"]

[Text] The port of Ravenna is a channel port approximately 11 kilometers in length. Two breakwaters 2,580 meters long constitute the "outpost" and extend outward into the sea until a depth of 10 meters is attained.

Over its entire length the channel currently ranges from a minimum of 150 to a maximum of 370 meters in width. It has a depth of 9.4 meters for approximately 7 kilometers and 5.5 meters for 3.5 kilometers.

This channel was recently linked to the Piombone channel, which is approximately 4 kilometers in length and currently has a depth of 7 meters and on which numerous shipbuilding activities have been established or are in the process of being established.

The various channels have a total potential for development of approximately 30 kilometers of wharves.

The principal channel has been equipped with an illumination system comprising 500 light sources which renders it navigable at night and in any kind of weather.

At the present time the total wharfage engaged in port activity is as follows:

a. Commercial wharves with a water depth of 9.4 meters: 5,850 meters.

b. Commercial wharves with a water depth of 5.5 meters: 2,135 meters.

c. Commercial wharves with a water depth of 7 meters: 671 meters.

There are also five landing stages for the discharge of liquid cargo.

Vessels of any tonnage can proceed as far as San Vitale Dock provided their length does not exceed 250 meters and their draft 28 feet.

A major effort is being made to expedite mechanization of the various operations involved in cargo handling.

With a staff of 1,200, the "Port Company" ensures the availability of a highly qualified labor force. It ensures to the users of the port that their goods will be handled expeditiously with respect both to loading and to unloading.

The commercial aspect of port activity is basically under the authority of SAPIR [Ravenna Intermodal Port Company, Incorporated], whose capital stock is mainly publicly owned, with a majority of the publicly-owned shares being held by the Emilia-Romagna Region, Ravenna Province, Ravenna Municipality, the CCIAA [expansion unknown] of Ravenna, and the ENI/ANIC [National Hydrocarbons Agency/National Agency for the Hydrogenation of Fuel].

SAPIR is active in certain areas of promotion, planning and construction and also shares in the direct management of the activities of the port.

Within this framework, SAPIR is (among other things) performing the functions of managing--and completing--San Vitale Dock, which represents the most advanced form of public participation to date.

The noteworthy trend toward development that has characterized the port in recent years has focused attention on the necessity of adapting it rapidly to existing and potential requirements.

For this purpose an appropriate multiyear plan--funded by the state, the regions and SAPIR--has been finalized.

Both the implementation of the program, and the requirements for future growth and improvement, are made easier to fulfill by the fact that all lands adjacent to the waters of the port over a total area of approximately 300 hectares are publicly owned.

The principal projects under the plan currently being implemented are as follows:

a. Improvement of the entrance to the channel and port.

b. Expansion of the existing inner bodies of water, and creation of three turning basins each with a diameter of 500 meters.

c. Dredging of the channel to a depth of 11.5 meters from the sea to the Trattaroli turning basin, and to a depth of 10.5 meters from there to San Vitale Dock.

d. Construction of 300 meters of commercial wharves with a water depth of 10.5 meters.

e. Construction of 1,080 meters of commercial wharves with a water depth of 11.5 meters.

f. Construction of 250 meters of docks for shipbuilding activities, with a water depth of 7 meters.

g. Construction of 350 meters of docks for shipbuilding activities, with a water depth of 9.5 meters.

h. Construction of a rail link between Ravenna Station and San Vitale Dock.

i. Construction of a Port Administration Center consisting of offices, a canteen, rest rooms, sleeping quarters, bank teller windows, postal and telecommunications offices, shops and an athletic field, for a total volume of 60,000 cubic meters.

j. Construction of a terminal for the loading and discharging of grain and flour, to consist of 330 meters of wharves, two unloading towers with a total capacity of 400 tons per hour, and warehouses with a total storage capacity of 100,000 tons.

k. Construction of a timber terminal consisting of 400 meters of wharves, 100,000 square meters of yard area, and two 85-meter portal cranes.

l. Construction of specialized facilities for the loading and unloading of sacked cargo.

The port of Ravenna participates (together with the Bologna and Parma Interports) in the implementation of the new regional system for intermodal transportation.

The Maritalia Company has found its own operational function within the framework of this development, in its capacity as Maritime Shipping Agency for the 18 Soviet shipping enterprises and also as dispatching agency. Maritalia has developed three sectors of activity in particular: a shipping agency; container lines, with 11 ports of call in a total of 10 countries; and lastly, specialized activities in connection with the loading of plant installations, miscellaneous merchandise, machinery and pipes onto traditional vessels that have regular ports of call, and in particular as regards exports to the USSR.

In 1979 a total of 13,058,799 tons of cargo, and approximately 150,000 containers, was handled in the port of Ravenna.

10992
CSO: 3104

FORMER CP-CHAIRMAN LARSEN ATTACKS PRESENT PARTY COURSE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 18 Jul 80 p 6

[Interview with Reidar T. Larsen, former chairman of the Norwegian Communist Party, by Per-Arne Bjerke]

> [Text] "The NKP [Norwegian Communist Party] has retreated to old positions which we previously fought against. That was confirmed by the Afghanistan affair. I think it is deplorable," said Reidar T. Larsen in an interview with ARBEIDERBLADET. This fall the former chairman of the NKP will publish the first part of his political memoirs. The book covers the period after 1960. A second volume will follow later, in which Larsen will tell the story of the Furubotn trouble of 1949, relate his experiences in the cold war, and give a glimpse of his youth in the 1930's.

Today Larsen has climbed down off the barricades. He works for the consumer ombudsman, and observes political life from a short distance.

[Question] Do you wish that you were back in the front lines?

[Answer] I am still a member of the executive board of SV [Socialist Party of the Left], although on leave for the moment. I continue to be occupied with politics, and I maintain my interest. But when I left the Storting in 1977 I needed a rest. I was completely worn out.

[Question] When you wanted to unify the NKP and the SF [Socialist People's Party] the party turned its back on you. Did that surprise you?

[Answer] I knew that there were diffent conceptions of the unification question within the NKP. What surprised me was the sudden course change by the party majority. Suddenly a number of the members were against unification. I believe that was because we had only a limited time for our discussions, and the matter was hurried. If we had had more time the outcome could have been different.

[Question] Finn Gustavsen claims in his book that it was Moscow which instructed the NKP to say no.

[Answer] Moscow has, of course, nothing to say about what the NKP does. On the other hand there is no doubt that both Moscow and the other progressive parts of the world communist movement were sceptical about unification in SV. And they expressed their scepticism clearly.

[Question] And that caused the NKP to break off unification negotiations?

[Answer] I believe that scepticism toward the unification effort in other countries could have contributed to influencing some of the NKP's members. Inside SF it was especially Finn Gustavsen who opposed unification with the NKP. There were several SF members who doubted whether unification was right, but Gustavsen was perhaps the one who spoke out most clearly.

[Question] In the last analysis do you really believe that it was possible to establish a unified party out of SF and NKP, even though you promoted the idea?

[Answer] Yes, I believed it then and I believe it now. If we had taken more time it could have been possible to unify the two parties. But the timetable which was arranged contributed heavily to upsetting cooperation. Without the urgency of time it would have been possible to arrange agreement on unification with a minimum of divisiveness. And there is no doubt that the rupture between SF and NKP in 1975 contributed to a weakening of the left in Norwegian politics.

[Question] How do you believe that the Socialist Party of the Left is functioning today?

[Answer] I am not satisfied with the party. Things are calm within the party, and that is favorable. But the party has not the strength to go on the offensive. We are becalmed, and we must try to come out of it.

9287
CSO: 3108

ARMED FORCES HOPES FOR CLARIFICATION OF LABOR LAW

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Liv Hegna: "Junior Officers and NCO's Place Their Trust in Ronbeck"]

> [Text] Such a chaos of pay systems, fractions and resolutions. That is the impression one gets when one reads the minutes of the meetings between the Defense Ministry and the junior officers and NCO's organizations which have discussed the introduction of labor laws in the armed forces. After a deadlock the matter was sent to the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Administration. "We now place all of our trust in Cabinet Minister Sissel Ronbeck. She is known to be an advocate of clear writing and good Norwegian," said the chairman of the Junior Officers and NCO's Collective Organization, Trond Tangen, to AFTENPOSTEN.

AFTENPOSTEN has learned, however, that there is reason to believe that Tangen's optimism will be severely tested in the future.

In the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Administration they are naturally prepared to do their utmost to clear the decks in this involved situation and bring the labor laws to the armed forces' 12,000 military personnel. For the 12,000 to 13,000 civilians in the Defense Ministry the labor laws are already applicable.

But in the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Administration the same optimism as that expressed by Tangen does not prevail. "Why should we clear up the Defense Ministry's problems?" they ask.

If the union, which has now taken over on behalf of the junior officers and NCO's organizations, can not agree with the ministry, the matter will go to the wage committee. There will be no talk of a strike, because it is a question of a special agreement outside the usual pay dispute that is under consideration.

Time is, however, running out in connection with the labor laws in the Defense Ministry. AFTENPOSTEN has learned from sources in the ministry that the uncertainty which exists in connection with working conditions and working decisions is contributing to the numerous departures of junior officers and NCO's from the armed forces.

For their part, the organizations have requested for a long time that labor laws be made applicable in the armed forces. According to Tangen the organizations claim to understand that there are "administrative difficulties for the ministry" in introducing the law before 1 January 1981, especially in view of the new changes which will be rumbling through the Defense Ministry. "The organizations have, however, decided to insist that the law be placed in effect by 1 July of this year," Tangen said to AFTENPOSTEN.

Guard duty, drills, and alerts must be defined as work, according to the organizations. "We do not wish to be put off with small fixed one-time payments as compensation for overtime, such as for exercises, which can extend many hours past normal working hours.

9287
CSO: 3108

AIRLINES' RECESSION AIDS AIR FORCE PILOT RETENTION

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 17 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Stein Morch-Hansen: "The Pilot Crisis Is Over in the Air Force"]

> [Text] A tightening in civil aviation is the reason why predictions from 1979 of an increasing pilot crisis in the air force are no longer valid. "When the civilian market for pilots becomes tighter, the number of applications for retention by pilots with up to eight years service increases," said Lieutenant Colonel Thor Eidem of the Air Force Inspector's Office of the Defense Staff.

"We now expect that we will have sufficient numbers to cover pilot requirements in the future, but there will continue to be shortages of experienced, highly educated pilots from the Air Force War College or the Air Force Academy. That means that recruiting of qualified pilots for the central and regional staffs will continue to be a problem. Our first concern is that leadership will be weakened. Also, problems with helicopter pilots will continue," said Lieutenant Colonel Eidem.

"For the time being we have not noticed any direct sign of improvement, but we think it correct to conclude that there will be a short-range improvement--that will depend on business conditions in civil aviation. And that has gone in cycles before. But we can of course hope that this tendency in civil aviation will continue long enough to enable us to build up our organization again. The experience level in our staffs is still too low, and it will take time to build it up to a satisfactory level.

"One principal cause for the tightening in civil aviation is the increasing cost of fuel. We must therefore keep our options open so that in a relatively few years we can have a surplus of trained pilots from the air force," said Eidem.

The air force has a total requirement for 400-500 trained pilots, including those needed on regional and central staffs.

It was the report of the Fjermerose Commission in 1979 which depicted a gloomy future for the air force, at a time when the manpower situation was so critical that the air force staff had to apply operational restrictions.

9287
CSO: 3108

BRIEFS

NORTHERN NAVAL PATROL GAP--Oslo, 18 Jul--The ship situation for the coastal patrol of north Norway is not favorable. Two inspection ships will be taken out of service in the fall and will probably be broken up. In addition the "Nornen" will be delayed until October or November after a shipyard overhaul, according to information given to the LOFOTPOSTEN by Captain John Arst at Harstad Naval District. "Nordkapp" will be laid up in August, and the crew will train to take over the first new coastal patrol ship coming out in January. "Senja" will be laid up in October, and the crew will be trained to take over the next coastal patrol ship coming out one month later than the first. Then there will be only four ships remaining. Coastal patrol authorities have therefore sought to obtain two new ships to cover the inspection of the new zone around Jan Mayan. The two new ships will be engaged in testing of new material such as the use of helicopters in inspection. As for small patrol craft, there will be 32 this fall, equally divided among Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark. The first ones will go in service at the end of August. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Jul 80 p 3]9287

CSO: 3108

DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF POPULATION STUDIED

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 25-31 Jul 80 Supplement pp 6, 7

[Article by Daniel Amaral: "Portuguese Population: Need for Planning Sectorial Changes"]

[Text] More than once we have had occasion to assert that unemployment, with the dimensions that it has assumed in our country for the past several years, must be the most complex problem existing in Portugal at present; even more so than inflation, despite the fact that the latter, with the widespread rise in prices, is where those responsible for the economic policies of the various countries are "investing" most in their battle against a crisis which is gradually devouring them. A few weeks ago, during the summit meeting in Venice attended by the seven most industrialized countries with market economies, the issue cropped up again, in terms that leave no room for doubt on anyone's part: Inflation is now the number one enemy to conquer.

We admit that the option is correct in heavily industrialized and economically advanced countries. The unemployment subsidies are usually reasonable, meeting the most basic needs and, insofar as we know, not creating any survival problem. But that is not the case in Portugal. Even if we disregard the countless limitations and natural difficulties involved in procuring any subsidy, even if we readily admit this, when such a sum is received, it is more in the nature of alms than something serving the purpose of insuring anyone's survival. This is why we claim that the battle against unemployment, rather than the battle against inflation, should be a priority in Portugal.

According to official statistics, the figures of which we presume to be underestimated, at the end of 1979 there were 343,000 unemployed in our country out of an active civil population of 4,142,000, representing 8.3 percent, and hence the highest rate in Europe. Of those 343,000, 192,000 (or 56 percent) were seeking their first job, and nearly two thirds of them were women; which proves that it is more difficult for the female population to obtain work. This year, according to information supplied by the Ministry of Labor's General Directorate of Employment, the number of those seeking employment

(reacting, in principle, to the variations in unemployment, even though there may not be an exact relationship between the two phenomena), those seeking employment, as we said, showed an increase of 2,100 in January, then another increase of 1,000 in February, following by a decline of 700 in March. This trend has continued until the present judging from recent statements made by the state secretary for population and employment, who claimed that the number of recorded unemployed declined from 307,000 to 279,000 between January and June of this year.

We must say, in all honesty, that the view which we have of the problem in no way relates to the perspective based on the figures that we have just revealed. Our impression, owing mainly to the marked slowdown in investment, is that unemployment is on the rise. But, even if it were not, we maintain, for the reasons given, that it is the number one problem facing us.

Thus, in our opinion, very serious thought must be given to the employment problem. This involves a problem dating back to a previous phase, which has determined it: the general study of the population, its structure, its composition by age, its occupational and sectorial distribution, etc.

Along the line of the brief studies which we make monthly and publish in this paper, we propose today to deal with this issue of the Portuguese population. We shall use for this purpose two booklets from the collection entitled "Studies," recently published by the Ministry of Labor: "Projection of the Continent's Active Population Up Until 1990," and "Study on the Rate of Sectorial Employment," both by Antonio Brito Ramos and Margarida Abecassis.

The Resident Population in Portugal and the Prospects for Its Evolution

According to the first of the aforementioned studies, there are in Portugal at present 9,423,000 people, 53 percent of whom are women. In this connection we point out a strange phenomenon, which we presume holds true for all the nations of the world: More males are born, but they die sooner than the females, allowing themselves, in later life, to be exceeded by the latter in numbers. The pyramid shown in Graph 1 which, although estimated, reflects the Portuguese population status in 1980, is significant in this regard: Starting at zero and up to age 25, there are always more men than women, but thereafter the situation is reversed until finally, with the greatest difference occurring precisely in old age, the men die and the woman remain. Specifically, and still relying on the study that we are analyzing, there are in our country today 983,000 persons 65 years of age or older, and 60 percent of them are women. Attention, members of the male group: It would appear that something will have to be done; "they" cannot continue "killing us" so soon any longer....

The estimates relating to the future evolution of the Portuguese population do not coincide. A World Bank report published in 1979 states that the average growth during the period 1970-77 was 0.8 percent per year; and, thereafter, it estimates for our country a population of 11 million by the

year 2000, and 14 million by 2095, which will represent the limit on population growth, that is, the year after which births and deaths will be virtually equivalent in numbers. The Labor Ministry study which we are analyzing makes an estimate only until 1990 when, in its view, there will be 9,954,000 people in Portugal. Apart from the magnanimity of the estimates that have been made, which are not in question here, this appears to us to be too low a figure to relate to the reality. Moreover, we are beginning to doubt the number given as that of the current population, namely, 9.4 million, when, for example, an OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] study claims that our population in 1978 numbered 9.7 million.

Upon summarizing all the information that we have read on the subject, it would appear that we can conclude that the Portuguese population is currently increasing at a rate of 1.1 percent per year, a figure which corresponds "roughly" to a birth rate of 1.7 percent and a death rate of 0.6 percent per year. If this is the case, it is a rate of growth quite similar to that of Spain, and considerably higher than the average European growth rate at present: 0.2 and 0.3 percent per year.

We recently wrote that the unemployment in Spain, particularly when it is considered from a potential standpoint, is currently one of the most complex problems interfering with the prospects of that country's entry into the Common Market. The same should be said of Portugal, although from more of an internal standpoint: with a growth of 1.1 percent, there are nearly 100,000 more people each year that elapses. Meanwhile, the children are growing and becoming adults, and they are entering the job market. It is no exaggeration if, discounting the present unemployment, we were to consider something like 50,000 new jobs per year.

Resident Population and Active Population

If we probe deeply into the analysis of the resident population, through its various dichotomies, we shall find, first of all, following the criterion of availability, an active and a nonactive population; and then, following the criterion of utilization, an employed and an unemployed population (Graph 2). In this connection, the second Labor Ministry study which we are analyzing gives 1978 figures, which are of the following dimensions: resident population, 9,270,000; active population, 3,643,000 (39.2 percent); employed population, including military service, 3,162,000 (86.8 percent of the active population); unemployed population, 481,000 (13.2 percent). Even though it is not the main purpose of this article, it should be noted, in this regard, that the 13.2 percent rate (unlike the 8-9 percent usually cited by the various governments that we have had) appears to us to be more consistent with the reality of unemployment in Portugal today.

If we subtract from the total active population (3,643,000) the unemployed (481,000) and the military (57,000), we arrive at what is called the active population engaged in an occupation (3,105,000), something which warrants a more intensive analysis.

In 1978, the active population with an occupation (85.3 percent of the total active population) was distributed as follows (Chart 1): 66.7 percent were working for someone else, 13.9 percent were working alone, 1.3 percent were business owners, and the remaining 3.4 percent were relatives or others not receiving pay. More specifically, the business owners and unpaid relatives have been gradually losing ground to those working for someone else, who, in turn, are very likely to "join" the unemployed. Graph 3 gives an idea of the significance which the business owners have been losing in the percentage of the active population with an occupation, with the passage of time: 6 percent in 1960, 3.2 percent in 1970, 1.5 percent in 1978. In 1978, they did not exceed 47,000, as compared with 186,000 in 1960.

The independent workers increased from 410,000 to 505,000, improving slightly their relative significance in the computation of the active population with an occupation.

The number of working relatives declined greatly, from 218,000 to only 125,000 between 1960 and 1978. But, as might be expected, the most significant rise occurred in the unemployed population, which increased from 77,000 (2.4 percent) to 481,000 (13.2 percent).

There is also a reference to the population performing compulsory military service: from 25,000 in 1960 it increased to 133,000 in 1970 (when the war in Africa was intense), and it then became stable at 57,000 in 1976. There is one question, perhaps a nonsensical one, but one which is warranted for those like ourselves who are not experts on the subject: Why is it that, in 1978, when peace prevailed, there was more than twice the military population than in 1960, when it was anticipated that the war would begin?

Those Working for Someone Else

Of the active population engaged in an occupation, one group should stand out among all others: those who are working for someone else, which is the status of the overwhelming majority of Portuguese workers.

In a temporary analysis, one finds that the number of these workers changed from 2,312,000 in 1960 (72 percent of the active population) to 2,428,000 in 1978 (67 percent of the active population). In other words, the relative significance decreased in time, when exactly the opposite should have occurred, because many of those who had been business owners and working relatives ceased to be such. But the reason is simple, as we have observed, and it is based on the volume of unemployment, which increased enormously in the meantime.

Turning to a sectorial analysis, we find that the changes which have occurred in our country are analogous to those which have taken place in all the nations of the world, and only the speed may have been greater or less. In the first phase, the population tends to become concentrated in the primary

sector, represented by agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing. Later, as economic development, which is mainly industrial, takes place, the population moves from the primary sector to the secondary sector (industries) and to the tertiary sectory (services). Finally, during the very advanced phase of development, there is a second move, from industry to services.

Naturally, situations vary from one country to another, on the basis of various factors, but this is the rule: The more evolved an economy is, the fewer people are employed in agriculture and the more are employed in industry and services. Some indicators confirm what we have said: In Portugal (1977 figures) the active population was distributed with 27 percent in agriculture (44 percent in 1960), 36 percent in industry (29 percent in 1960) and 37 percent in services (27 percent in 1960). But, the average for the industrialized countries during that same year and in that same order was: 7 percent, 38 percent and 55 percent. And the situation in the United States was: 3 percent, 33 percent and 64 percent. The trend is obvious, as is our lag with respect to the developed countries, in this area as in so many others.

But we said that the changes which have taken place in Portugal are analogous to those in other countries. In fact, this is so, as may be noted from Chart 2: Of the 2.3 million people working for someone else in our country during 1960, 35 percent were doing so in the primary sector, another 35 percent in industry and the remaining 30 percent in services. But the situation changed completely 18 years later: There were only 16 percent (less than half!) in the primary sector, and the rest had moved to industry (40 percent) and services (54 percent).

It would be interesting at this point to learn exactly why all these workers, within such a short period of time, transferred from one sector to another, because these changes were not always associated with a process of economic development. In the case of services, exactly the opposite may have held true, owing to a certain amount of passive attitude at times in receiving the unemployment from other sides through underemployment. We presume that it would not be difficult at present to obtain consensus regarding the existence of individuals whom we could call employed only with great magnanimity, because they have no activity other than receiving their wages at the end of the month. It is sad but true, and we are all familiar with such cases, but this has nothing to do with the honest workers who expend their best efforts and who are of course in the majority. Hence, as we have said, it would be interesting to learn the reasons for all this change. However, the Labor Ministry's studies to which we are referring do not probe deeply into this matter which, moreover, would be difficult.

The Business Owners and Their Sectorial Distribution

A group which it is also important to analyze, if only for socioeconomic reasons, is that of the business owners.

As we have observed, in 1960 the business owners numbered 186,000, representing 6 percent of the active population at the time. Ten years later, in 1970, they totaled only 72,000, or 2 percent of the active population. And the decline continued progressively, with the total reaching only 47,000 in 1978. An increase of 13 percent in the active population between 1960 and 1978 was matched, in the number of business owners, by a reduction to only a quarter of the initial figure. In this respect also, the study does not reveal the reason for this change, but there is every indication that it related essentially to small farmers, small manufacturers and small merchants who ceased to be such.

Moreover, Chart 3 appears to suggest exactly that: In 1960, there were 77,000 business owners in the primary sector, and in 1978 there were only 11,000; in 1960 there were 40,000 business owners in the manufacturing industry, and in 1978 there were only 10,000; in 1960 there were 45,000 business owners in the areas of trade, banking insurance, etc., and in 1978 there were only 16,000.

Relatively speaking, during the period under analysis, there has been a certain amount of stabilization in industry, wherein business owners have always accounted for about 25 percent, as well as a large-scale transfer from the primary to the tertiary sector. At present, the latter has 45 percent of the business owners, whereas in 1960 the figure did not exceed 33 percent. The former sector does not have over 22 percent at present, whereas it formerly had as much as 41 percent.

Three Brief Conclusions

The analysis that we have made allows us to draw three very quick conclusions: In the first place, that the population has been moving from agriculture to industry and services, following the normal course of economic development. Secondly, that business owners, although not tending to disappear, something that would be absurd in a market economy such as ours, are at least tending to lose ground as a whole; because at present their numbers do not total a quarter of what they were in 1960. Thirdly, and most important of all, that unemployment is increasing to a shocking extent, creating a very complicated problem for the consecutive governments: namely, that of absorbing those currently unemployed, and creating an additional 50,000 jobs per year to cope with the population growth.

During these past 6 years since the April revolution, no one has yet succeeded in achieving something that is critical to economic development: a planning in intervals. There was only one attempt, albeit a very serious one, during the administration of the First Constitutional Government; however, the attempt failed, because the government fell. Within a few months, we shall have new elections, and subsequently a new government, theoretically for 4 years. We would like the new government to consider this: that it is necessary to plan and program, and then to perform the tasks that it has programmed. We leave here these figures (and this message) for the government which is to come.

Quadro 1
Situação da «população activa» (1)

(2) Discriminação	(3) Número (milhares)					(4) Estrutura (%)				
	1960	1970	1976	1977	1978	1960	1970	1976	1977	1978
1. População activa com profissão (5)	3126	3189	3102	3102	3105	96,8	93,6	88,1	86,3	85,3
• Patrões (6)	186	72	52	49	47	5,8	2,1	1,5	1,4	1,3
• Isolados (7)	410	549	527	511	505	12,7	16,3	14,7	14,3	13,9
• Trab. por conta de outrem (8)	2312	2431	2385	2417	2428	71,6	71,5	67,0	67,1	66,7
• Fam. e outros não remunerados (9)	218	138	128	125	125	6,7	3,8	3,6	3,5	3,4
2. População desempregada (10)	77	86	416	441	481	2,4	2,5	11,6	12,3	13,2
3. Pop. em serviço militar obrig. (11)	25	133	67	57	57	0,8	3,9	1,8	1,5	1,5
Total da população activa (12)	3228	3399	3575	3600	3643	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Fonte: Ministério do Trabalho (13)

Key:

1. Chart 1, Status of the "Active Population"
2. Breakdown
3. Number (thousands)
4. Structure (%)
5. Active population with occupation
6. Business owners
7. Independent
8. Working for someone else
9. Relatives and others not receiving pay
10. Unemployed population
11. Population in compulsory military service
12. Total active population
13. Source: Ministry of Labor

Quadro 2

(1) **Trabalhadores por conta de outrem, por sectores de actividade**

(2) Sectores	(3) Número (milhares)					(4) Estrutura (%)				
	1960	1970	1976	1977	1978	1960	1970	1976	1977	1978
1. Agricultura, silvicultura e caça (5)	770,5	444,7	380,5	375,0	367,6	33,3	18,3	15,9	15,5	15,1
2. Pesca (6)	34,3	27,1	18,6	19,4	19,3	1,5	1,1	0,8	0,8	0,8
3. Indústrias extractivas (7)	25,1	11,4	10,4	10,4	10,4	1,1	—	—	—	—
4. Indústrias transformadoras (8)	570,2	739,7	701,8	697,8	701,1	24,7	30,4	29,3	28,9	28,9
5. Construção e Obras Públicas (9)	203,7	242,1	246,9	268,2	269,1	8,8	10,0	10,3	11,1	11,1
6. Electr., Gás, Água e Saneam. (10)	14,0	19,2	17,2	17,6	18,7	—	—	—	—	—
7. Comércio, Bancos, Seguros, etc. (11)	153,4	229,8	337,6	339,9	344,6	6,6	9,5	14,1	14,1	14,2
8. Transportes e Comunicações (12)	109,4	146,4	177,0	176,8	175,6	4,7	6,0	7,4	7,3	7,2
9. Serviços (13)	427,2	485,9	471,1	480,1	495,3	18,5	20,0	19,7	19,9	20,4
10. Actividades mal definidas (14)	4,7	84,8	33,7	31,2	25,9	—	3,5	1,4	1,3	1,1
Total (15)	2312,5	2431,1	2394,8	2416,4	2427,6	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Fonte: Ministério do Trabalho (16)

Key:

1. Chart 2, "Those Working for Others" According to Sectors of Activity
2. Sectors
3. Number (thousands)
4. Structure (%)
5. Agriculture, forestry and hunting
6. Fishing
7. Extractive industries
8. Manufacturing industries
9. Construction and public works
10. Electricity, gas, water and sanitation
11. Trade, banking,insurance, etc.
12. Transportation and communications
13. Services
14. Poorly defined activities
15. Total
16. Source: Ministry of Labor

Quadro 3
(1) Patrões, por sectores de actividade


(2) Sectores	(3) Números (milhares)					(4) Estrutura (%)				
	1969	1970	1976	1977	1978	1969	1970	1976	1977	1978
1. Agricultura, silvicultura e caça (5)	78,4	17,1	12,5	10,8	10,4	41,1	23,7	24,0	23,1	22,2
2. Pesca (6)	0,9	0,2	0,9	1,0	1,1	—	—	—	—	—
3. Indústrias extractivas (7)	0,5	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,1	—	—	—	—	—
4. Indústrias transformadoras (8)	39,8	18,0	11,3	10,3	9,4	21,4	24,9	21,7	21,1	20,0
5. Construção e Obras Públicas (9)	5,9	6,2	2,2	2,2	2,2	3,1	8,6	4,2	4,5	4,7
6. Electr. Gás, Águas e Saneam. (10)	0,1	0,2	1,0	0,9	0,6	—	—	—	—	—
7. Comércio, Bancos, Seguros, etc. (11)	45,1	21,2	16,4	14,3	14,3	24,2	29,3	31,5	33,4	34,8
8. Transportes e Comunicações (12)	3,6	1,7	1,0	1,0	0,9	1,2	2,3	—	—	—
9. Serviços (13)	13,6	5,3	4,8	4,8	4,5	7,3	7,3	9,2	9,4	9,6
10. Actividades mal definidas (14)	0,1	2,0	1,8	1,5	1,4	—	—	—	—	—
Total (15)	186,0	72,3	52,1	48,8	46,9	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Fonte: Ministério do Trabalho (16)

Key:

1. Chart 3,"Business Owners" According to Sectors of Activity
2. Sectors
3. Number (thousands)
4. Structure (%)
5. Agriculture, forestry and hunting
6. Fishing
7. Extractive industries
8. Manufacturing industries
9. Construction and public works
10. Electricity, gas, water and sanitation
11. Trade, banking, insurance, etc.
12. Transportation and communications
13. Services
14. Poorly defined activities
15. Total
16. Source: Ministry of Labor

Gráfico 1
População residente, por sexos e grupos etários (1980)*




(6) * Estimativa

(7) Fonte: «Projecção da População Activa do Continente até 1980» Ministério do Trabalho, 1979


Key:

1. Graph 1, Resident Population According to Sex and Age Groups (1980)
2. Men
3. Years
4. Women
5. Thousands
6. Estimated
7. Source: "Projection of the Active Population of the Continent Up Until 1980," Ministry of Labor, 1979



Key:

1. Graph 2, Active Population and Its Dichotomies (1978)
2. Thousands
3. Population
4. First dichotomy (criterion of availability)
5. Yes
6. No
7. Active
8. Nonactive
9. Second dichotomy (criterion of utilization)
10. Employed
11. Unemployed
12. Including the population performing compulsory military service (57,00)
13. Source: Ministry of Labor



Key:

1. Graph 3, Structure of the Active Population With an Occupation
2. Business owners
3. Independent
4. Those working for someone else
5. Relatives and others not receiving pay
6. Source: Ministry of Labor

2909
CSO: 3101

MEXICO'S RULES ON CRUDE OIL EXPORTS POSE PROBLEM FOR REFINERIES

LD140747 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Aug 80 p 21

[Report by Mats Hallgren: "Increased Problems With Mexican Oil"]

[Text] Mexico is to change its crude oil export regulations. In the future Mexico will demand of its customers that 60 percent of oil supplies comprise heavy, so-called maya crude, which has a high sulfur content, the well-informed newspaper PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY reports. This means that the oil agreement reached with Sweden this spring will be technologically more complicated. No Swedish refinery can today treat the heavy maya crude.

It was during Mexican President Portillo's visit to Stockholm in the early summer that a preliminary agreement was reached that Mexico should supply Sweden with 3.5 million tons of crude oil per year. This would correspond to approximately 10 percent of Sweden's total annual requirements.

A complication that was already noted during the president's visit was that Mexico required that 40 percent of supplies should comprise heavy crude with a high sulfur content.

Now the Mexican petroleum authorities have announced that buyers must take all of 60 percent in maya oil and that Mexico will not agree to the heavier part of the supplies being given away in exchange deals with other countries. Such exchanges, so-called swap agreements, are otherwise common between countries with different environmental stipulations.

"This further complicates our chances of reaching any real commercial agreements with Mexico," director Sture Agvald of Svenska Petroleum told DAGENS NYHETER.

"I do not want to rule out the possibility altogether, but at present there is no Swedish refinery which can treat the Mexican maya oil," he said.

Since the president's visit in May nothing concrete has happened on the oil front between Sweden and Mexico.

However, within a month a number of representatives of OK, Mynaes and Svenska Petroleum will travel to Mexico for technical discussions and negotiations.

The new export regulations do not, however, mean that the preliminary agreement from the spring is completely without interest. New technology being developed means that this oil too can be made useful. By means of partial oxidization the oil can be processed to make gas for heating and electricity. At present a project to develop just such a process is underway in Sweden.

CSO: 3109

ZURICH CITIZENS POLLED ON YOUTH RIOTS

Zurich Official's Position

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE in German 23 Jul 80 p 4

[Interview with Zurich City Councilman Dr Juerg Kaufmann by Alfred A. Haesler, Irene Prerost: "No Monopoly on Truth"]

[Text] A new controversy has arisen above and beyond the conflict about the youth demonstrations. The Zurich city council has leveled serious accusations against radio and television for heating up the situation and for manipulation.

WELTWOCHE: The Zurich city council has accused the media -- radio and television in particular-- of one-sided coverage, manipulation, etc. of the youth riots. Are the authorities telling the truth which we ought to be getting from the media ?

Kaufmann: Nobody has a monopoly on the truth. We are all looking for it. What really amazes me personally is the strange reaction of radio and television whenever they are criticized. We have to speak frankly to each other and both sides must try to live with criticism. We do not ask the media to accept any more criticism than we ourselves must take.

WELTWOCHE: Do you stick to your accusation that there was manipulation ?

Kaufmann: Yes, I do. Television did not film the 12 July demonstration in such a way that one could see the Molotov cocktails being made on Limmatstrasse and people buying gasoline and filling bottles with it.

WELTWOCHE: But would this type of coverage not have amounted to manipulation as well ?

Kaufmann: There is something to what you say. That would mean then that the TV reporter should take a position somewhere in the middle. He should be looking for the truth and not just for sensational coverage. But so far this has not happened.

WELTWOCHE: The demonstrators have criticized radio and television just as sharply as the authorities did-- a strange coalition. Does this not indicate that the media do in fact occupy a position somewhere in the middle ?

Kaufmann: Perhaps the authorities and the media are in something like the same boat. If so, we would both have to try to find a middle position as we search for the truth.

WELTWOCHE: The city council is vested with state authority. That lends a different weight to the criticism it raises. Was the criticism as "proportional" as it should be ?

Kaufmann: We do not have very much authority and I do not think we abuse it. But even now we must see to it that we do not lose it altogether. On the one hand, we are accused of being too tough and on the other, of being too soft. That being the case, it is perhaps understandable that we sometimes hit back a bit hard as we continue our quest for a middle ground.

WELTWOCHE: The city council was taken by surprise by the riots and has not yet gotten things under control again. The media "scapegoat" looks like a welcome opportunity to cover up your own mistakes.

Kaufmann: That is a pretty serious accusation. But the fact is we are not looking for a scapegoat; we are trying to combat the tendency of sensationalizing events, particularly on the part of radio and television. They would have to work very carefully and responsibly, seeing to it that sensationalism and the urge to be first do not lead to a distortion of reality which is counter-productive in that it heats up the demonstrators' feelings even more.

WELTWOCHE: Would you say that this "infinitesimal minority" of young people of which the city council is always speaking is giving expression to a widespread discontent, apparent for years among young people which has simply been overlooked.?

Kaufmann: That may be. What makes us unhappy is that the young people cannot get themselves to disassociate themselves from those who have had nothing but provocation and violence in mind from the start.

WELTWOCHE: Does the city council not make it more difficult for them to disassociate themselves from the rowdies, if it calls out the riot police in their robot masks ?

Kaufmann: Sitting here at a conference table, we could talk all day about the varieties of official violence. But once the first policeman is hit by a rock and seriously injured, things begin to look quite different. In Berne this time they took very stern measures right at the start of the riots, whereas we were somewhat restrained. That was not mentioned at all. Like it or not, there is an aggressive instinct in people. From the very start, there were provocations designed to cause violence to emerge.

WELTWOCHE: But the aggressive instinct can also be detected among the representatives of state authority.

Kaufmann: But the state has an absolute monopoly on power-- which we do not by any means abuse. But if there is a challenge of the type just made, one should not be surprised at the power actually being brought to bear.

WELTWOCHE: Would it not make sense for the city council to admit that it did not do everything it should have done with regard to the fringe youth groups, following the events of 1968 ?

Kaufmann: We have used the Theater 11, the Theater on the Neumarkt and the Red Factory among others to do something for members of the counter-culture-- a fact which a party not unknown to me has unfortunately seen fit to ignore.

WELTWOCHE: Culture is not restricted to consumption of culture. Just because young people appeared to be peaceful and reasonable over the past few years, we thought everything was fine.

Kaufmann: Perhaps too many young people started behaving in ways which raised certain expectations among us, but which many of them could not fulfill. They are satisfied with outward appearances and make anarchist demands for money on the very state they would just as soon turn into mincemeat. What they do not see is that the major anarchist thinkers were in fact activists.

WELTWOCHE: In 1968, you were on the side of the youth revolt. Now, you represent government authority. Has councilman Kaufmann changed as a result of the "long trek through the institutional hierarchy" ?

Kaufmann: In 1968, the political thrust was a good deal more sharply defined. We were undergoing a kind of renewal of ideology and that gave shape to the movement rather quickly. That is not the case today. Perhaps young people today want to start a process to do away with ideology. In view of my own intellectual makeup, I have just as much sympathy as ever for all youthful protesters. But today it is my job to tell young people, including my own children, that violent acts will not get them very far. There is no sense in mixing aesthetic pretensions with political actions because that might lead to a rapid polarization of the right. From the political end we must keep a certain distance from pretty much anything in the arts because otherwise things get dangerous.

Riots Not Typical

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE in German 23 Jul 80 p 4

[Text] Results for and against in percent of respondents to the following questions:

	All	Age 18-34	35-54	55 & over	Male	Female	City of Zurich	Country
These demonstrators are:								
typical for Zurich youth								
Yes	15.0	16.0	12.8	15.5	13.9	16.1	18.6	11.2
No	81.6	81.3	84.7	77.7	83.7	79.5	78.6	84.7
tools of Communists/ far left								
Yes	36.3	23.3	37.4	52.0	36.8	35.8	28.2	39.2
No	59.7	75.1	59.0	40.5	60.8	58.6	69.6	55.4
rowdies								
Yes	45.3	33.6	47.3	58.1	41.4	49.2	54.4	40.1
No	51.7	66.8	47.3	37.1	55.8	47.2	43.4	56.3

	All	Age 18-34	35-54	55 & over	Male	Female	City of Zurich	Country
youth who are badly off								
Yes	30.8	39.8	25.1	25.6	34.1	27.5	28.9	29.5
No	65.6	57.5	70.7	70.2	62.4	68.8	67.5	66.6
detriment to youth's cause								
Yes	78.3	68.3	83.6	85.1	79.0	77.5	84.8	74.4
No	18.1	29.5	13.4	8.7	17.4	18.8	15.1	19.9
hoping for youth center								
Yes	60.1	63.7	60.8	54.7	58.9	61.4	69.6	55.1
No	36.1	34.7	33.9	40.5	37.5	34.6	28.9	39.5

Citizens Back Authorities

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE in German 23 Jul 80 pp 4,5

/Article by Rudolf Baechtold: "Zurichers' Opinion on Youth Riots"/

/Text/ The overwhelming majority of the population of Zurich is satisfied with the way the Zurich youth riots were handled by the police and the city and regional councils. Those advocating a tougher policy outnumber those who accuse the authorities of having been too harsh. These are the most important findings of an Isopublic poll conducted on behalf of DIE WELTWOCHE

The poll was taken of a representative sample of the population of canton Zurich. The sample ranged in age from 18 to 74 and was equally divided between men and women. 38 percent of the sample came from the city of Zurich itself; 8 percent were from the city of Winterthur and 54 percent from the remainder of the canton. The poll was conducted between 25 June and 9 July 1980-- in other words, after the "Telebuehne" was called off but prior to the riots on the weekend of 12/13 July and prior to the bungled broadcast of the "CH-Magazin".

Opinion is not likely to have changed much since and if it has, then in the direction of a hardening of viewpoints.

The demonstrators clearly are not viewed as being "typical of Zurich youth"--with the 18 to 34 age group and the 55 and over group viewing them as typical after all; but presumably for different reasons.

A little more than a third believes the demonstrators to be tools of the communists and other far left groups, with more of the sample voicing this opinion with advancing age: 52 percent of those over 55 agree with the "communist" theory.

The age factor also plays a role in viewing the demonstrators as "rowdies". 45 percent of the entire sample thought they were rowdies; 52 percent thought they were not-- as opposed to 67 percent of the 18 to 34 age group.

Just about one third of those questioned thought that the demonstrators were young people who are badly off. Here, too, almost 40 percent of those in the 18 to 34 age group hold to this opinion with a mere 25 percent of each of the other age groups agreeing.

There is general agreement about the fact that the demonstrating youths do their cause more harm than good. Some 80 percent of the sample are of this opinion; but of those under the age of 34 only 68 percent hold to it.

Are the young people above all looking for a youth center ? Three-fifths of the sample, encompassing all age groups more or less evenly, believe this to be so.

The way the authorities, including the police, the city council, the dean of Zurich university and the canton government, handled the situation receives a swamp of approval by large majorities. The police and the dean get a 54 percent rating; the Zurich city council gets 49 percent and the canton government 46 percent. The latter was not too deeply involved in the events with the exception of education director Alfred Gilgen.

Vote for Gilgen ?

Government councillor Alfred Gilgen made his move and intervened in the course of events at a clearly definable instance. We are talking about the controversial videotape of the ethnology students. He has been criticized for this action by all and sundry and is being accused of having thereby carried the

unrest into the university itself. Would the population of Zurich re-elect Alfred Gilgen just the same ?

Question: "If elections were held today, would you give your vote to education director Alfred Gilgen ?"

	Total	Those with Opinion	Voters in 1979 Election	All Voters
		(in percent)		
Yes	35	55	45	74
No	29	45		
Don't Know	36			

As against 45 percent of all eligible voters in the canton Zurich who voted for education director Alfred Gilgen in the cantonal elections only 35 percent would do so now.

When the "those holding an opinion" figure is compared with the figure for those who actually voted last year, the result is a drop from 74 to 55 percent for those who would vote for government councillor Gilgen today.

It must be noted, however, that the sample took in some 18 year-olds and may have included as many as 5 percent aliens who are not eligible to vote. This particular question headed the list of those pertaining to the Zurich riots without any reference being made to the demonstrators or the role played by government councillor Gilgen. Another aspect which must be taken into account is the absence of any comparative data on the recognition factor among those only mildly interested in politics-- which means that none of the above can be taken as clear proof of the fact that only a small segment of the Zurich electorate approves of government councillor Gilgen's record.

54 percent of the sample approve of the conduct of the police. 25 percent consider it "not harsh enough;" 14 percent as "too harsh" and 7 percent had no opinion. More drastic measures on the part of the police were asked by those over 55 years of age (35 percent), by men (29 percent) and by the rural population (27 percent). Zurich city residents voiced their approval of police conduct. 63 percent said they "conducted themselves right;" 21 percent said they were "not harsh enough" and 10 percent thought they were "too harsh."

Question: "In your opinion, did the Zurich police act properly on the occasion of the different riots ? Were they too harsh or not harsh enough ?"

	Not Harsh Enough	Properly	Too Harsh	Don't Know
		(in percent)		
All Age Groups	25.0	53.9	13.8	7.2
18-34	20.7	54.4	19.1	5.6
35-54	21.0	54.9	12.8	11.1
55 & over	35.1	52.0	8.1	4.7
Male	29.4	49.2	16.2	4.6
Female	20.4	58.6	11.4	9.8
City	21.3	63.4	9.6	6.2
Canton	27.1	51.0	14.0	7.7

The opinions as to the conduct of the city council are almost the same. 25 percent called it "not harsh enough"; 49 percent called it "right" and 15 percent said it was "too harsh." As in the case of the police, three out of four canton-wide felt the city council had acted "properly" to "not harsh enough." But 23 percent of those under the age of 34 felt the city council had acted "too harshly." In the middle age group, there were 13 percent who thought so and among those over 55, only 7 percent did. "Not harsh enough" is how 21 percent of the youngest age group view it; in the middle age group, the figure is 25 percent and in the oldest age group it is 32 percent. The city-country relationship is such that 22 percent of the city residents as compared to 28 percent of the rural population take the "not harsh enough" view. 52 percent in the city as against 46 percent in the countryside call the city council's conduct "right"and 17 percent as against 13 percent call it "too harsh". The male and female percentage figures are almost identical in most instances, the only variation appearing in the "not harsh enough" category with 29 percent of the men opting for it as against 21 percent of the women.

Question: "How would you characterise the conduct of the police, the Zurich city council, the dean of the university and the Zurich canton government ?"

	Not Harsh Enough	Right	Too Harsh	Don't Know
		(in percent)		
Police	25	54	14	7
City Council	25	49	15	11
Dean	15	54	9	22
Canton Government	16	46	16	22

9478
CSO: 3103

SECRET JP MEMO SAID TO INITIATE ELECTION PREPARATIONS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 10 Jun 80 pp 1, 5

[Article: "Plans To Call Early Elections in October Outlined and Said To Be Based on Secret JP Internal Memo"]

[Text] Bursa, 10 Jun--HURRIYET NEWS AGENCY--The Justice Party has decided to call for early elections in October and has begun election preparations. It has been learned that the JP, which plans to come to power on its own, has the sole aim of bringing about the collapse of the NSP [National Salvation Party].

In a secret memorandum distributed to the entire party organization, it was announced that early elections would definitely be called in October, and it was ordered that preparations be made accordingly. At the same time it was decided that officials at the high echelons of the party be sent out to election districts to begin work as fast as possible.

The JP counts on receiving 55 percent of the vote in the event it succeeds in forcing an early election in October. The general view is that aside from the JP the NAP [Nationalist Action Party] is also growing in strength day by day, and thus even if the JP were unable to rule on its own, it could govern Turkey quite comfortably in coalition with the NAP. The JP, which reports that it has regions of Turkey critical to the elections under control, has decided to take on the task of ensuring at any cost that an administration in which right-wing views prevail can govern the country on its own. Plans have been made to avoid giving opportunities to the RPP and the other left-wing parties, and to bring about the thorough collapse of the NSP.

Ministers of state, members of parliament, officials from the high echelons of the party, as well as those who have officially "retired" from active participation in politics but are known to be JP supporters, have fanned out into the provinces, first of all to Bursa, and are known to be on the job.

On the other hand, it has also been learned that some industrialists and businessmen have been secretly contacted on the subject of early elections. Businessmen have been asked to make definite pledges to aid the JP with contributions.

9620
CSO: 4907

RPP YOUTH GROUP VOWS TO 'STRUGGLE AGAINST FASCISM'

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Jun 80 p 5

[Statement by Central Committee of RPP Youth Auxiliaries, RPP Youth Auxiliaries Provincial Chairmen at RPP midyear convention in Ankara]

[Text] Ankara, 11 Jun--CUMHURIYET BUREAU--The Central Committee of the RPP Youth Auxiliaries and the chairmen of the RPP's 49 Provincial Youth Auxiliaries announced in a joint statement made public yesterday that they were "steadfast in the struggle against fascism."

The chairmen of the RPP's Provincial Youth Auxiliaries, who had come to Ankara for the RPP's mini-congress, met with the Central Committee of the RPP Youth Auxiliaries at the party's Central Office and issued a joint statement, summarized as follows:

"In Turkey the occupation by fascist forces is spreading from governmental bodies down to cities, towns, and villages, accompanied by repression, tyranny, and blood.

"People in our country no longer have confidence in either civil servants or in the police. Government organizations, provinces and districts, have come to be virtually administered by the armed fascist militants of the NAP [Nationalist Action Party] and the UYD [Idealist Youth Association].

"Today in our country security of life and property, freedom of thought and belief are being threatened and repressed. Turkey is gradually being surrendered to a regime of exploitation and tyranny. Attacks are being consciously directed against the RPP, which has made struggle against this regime of exploitation and tyranny its aim. The minority government of the Justice Party, which (bears) the responsibility of governing the country, cannot escape responsibility for these attacks directed against the RPP."

The Fascists Will Also Turn Their Guns Against Members of the JP

In the statement of the Youth Auxiliaries Chairmen, those in the Justice Party administration were also warned that, "they should be aware of the fact that the day will come when the armed militants of the NAP and the illegal fascist organizations will turn their weapons on well-intentioned, pro-democratic members of the JP." The statement continues as follows:

"Because of the general character of fascism, we have no difficulty in making these determinations. In the Turkey of 19[illegible] the JP minority government cannot cope with problems by increasi[illegible].ts attacks on the RPP. The problems of our country cannot be solved wi[illegible] conomic and political measures which do not even conform with the req[illegible]ments of the capitalist system of our age."

A Call For Struggle Against Fascism

The statement, which pointed out that by attacking the RPP the JP had fallen into the anti-democratic line of the NAP, continued by setting forth the following views:

"Both the RPP and its Chairman General Bulent Ecevit's struggle on behalf of democracy have an important place and function in this country. To ignore this reality, to obstinately pretend ignorance of this concrete state of affairs, and then to attempt holding the RPP and its Chairman General morally responsible for acts of terrorism, shows a treachery beyond the bounds of reason.

"The RPP and its membership are consciously struggling against fascism. This is because the RPP and its membership have a (true democratic character). The youth of the RPP have learned a good lesson in democracy in Turkey. The youth of the RPP have in their platform against fascism the faith and spirit of national independence against exploitation and dependence.

"We who share in this belief, as the chairmen of the RPP Youth Auxiliary groups and as administrators who carry the political responsibilities of RPP youth on our shoulders, hereby collectively announce to the public our determination in the struggle against fascism."

9620
CSO: 4907

PARTISAN POLITICIANS CALLED REAL 'ENEMIES OF STATE'

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 16 Jul 80 p 3

/Column by Oktay Eksi: "Is This Preservation?"/

/Text/ RPP General Chairman Bulent Ecevit, prompted by a speech which Interior Minister Mustafa Gulcugil made a few days ago, commented that "they ought to go to the prosecutor and confess." He also added that they were going to introduce a parliamentary question on Gulcugil.

Let me tell you what Gulcugil said that created so vehement a reaction. The interior minister said:

"The right is helping the development of anarchy by undertaking actions to stop the communists. Thinking they are helping the state, they are helping terrorism and divisiveness. If it were not for the right, the state would have only the leftist activists to combat. If the right wants to help the state, it should give up actions. They should know that the state does not need help. The state conducts the struggle against the communists."

Mr Gulcugil's choice of words is indeed unfortunate. He seems to be saying that the right-wing sector has a role in the anarchy and terrorism. These words represent a change, a development, from the standpoint of the government in office. But for an interior minister to approach as a "supplicant" a sector which he personally said was involved in anarchy and terrorism is incomprehensible, because, by whatever reasoning, the interior minister is the one responsible for combatting and eliminating any authority which attempts to replace the authority of the state. This is the first condition of the responsiblilty placed upon him by the office he occupies.

Whatever attitude an interior minister adopts toward places made into "liberated regions" by the left is the same attitude he must adopt toward "liberated regions" formed by the right or anyone else.

If you ask me, the current attitude is the reason for the current government's inability -- indeed, its failure -- yet to achieve any serious results against anarchy and terrorism. And this is because the citizen in the street does not attempt to help the state unless he believes that the state is impartial and acts with the same determination and firmness toward all lawbreakers. He does not, for example, tell the state what he knows, because he is afraid the state will turn him over to the street toughs one day. The state which has to deal with terrorism and anarchy alone ends up fumbling in the dark.

There is another point it would be well to point out here:

Those who say today, "They ought to go to the prosecutor and confess," that is, those who want justice done and the criminals punished, have not done their own duty in respect of "protecting the authority of the state" and "establishing the supremacy of the law." For example, they uttered not a sound as Fatsa was being converted to a "liberated region." They tolerated the phasing out of state authority there; they have made not the slightest effort to take command of the state.

To make a long story short, the real enemy of the state in Turkey is not the street tough. The enemy of the state is the politicians who will not give it guidance, who block its ability to function "impartially." Nothing will change until these men stop selling this state for temporary political gain.

8349
CSO: 4907

PARTIES URGED TO UNITE AGAINST ANARCHY

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 17 Jul 80 p 3

/Column by Oktay Eksi: "Why Ask?"/

/Text/ Now everybody is asking each other: Who killed RPP Istanbul National Deputy Abdurrahman Koksaloglu?

Who, indeed? First his own party, the members of that party in parliament, the members in parliament of the Justice Party which sits in the seat of government at the moment, the national deputies and senators of the Nationalist Action Party which is engaged in a violent quarrel with the Republican Peoples Party, the National Salvation Party which, though it declared from the beginning that this nation could not succeed with the present government, helped form this government, thinking, "Let the country sink a little more and see how valuable we are" -- they all joined hands and killed Abdurrahman Koksaloglu.

Have no doubt: We are not joking. The death of the late Koksaloglu is far too serious a matter to joke about it.

Indeed, the governments which for years have failed to take serious, impartial and radical measures against anarchy and terrorism, the coalition partners in those governments and the parties which supported and guided those governments killed Abdurrahman Koksaloglu.

At one time, the entire civilized world used to say, "The opium poppies grown in Turkey are the most important source of narcotics smuggling." It is true that Turkey's name was blackened because of the narcotics made from its poppies. And the Turkish government (in 1971) even "banned poppy cultivation" under pressure from the United States.

Then what happened?

The government formed in 1974 both carried out the ban on poppy cultivation and set up an inspection system making it impossible to produce narcotics from poppies.

Thus Turkey's stained honor was redeemed in the eyes of the entire world. It is true that Turkish names still appear frequently in large narcotics smuggling incidents. But the whole world knows that this is the work of smugglers from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malaysia, in short, of Middle and Far Eastern smugglers who use Turkey as a bridge. Everybody agrees that the Turkish police wage a valiant struggle against these smugglers.

Even more important is this: The leaders of a state proved that, if they sincerely want to, they can succeed, even at something as hard to fight as narcotics smuggling.

The same applies for the fight against anarchy and terrorism. In other words, if Turkey's leaders and aspiring leaders really want to, it is not hard to wipe out anarchy and terrorism in our country. But the first condition in attaining this end is for the cadres in power to resolve to form "an impartial state administration" and convince everybody that they mean it. It is likewise a condition that the ruling and opposition parties pass at once the "extraordinary circumstances" law and the "State Security Courts" law which are vital to the fight against anarchy and terrorism, and that they rescue from where they are languishing in the houses of parliament the laws enabling severe sentences for arms smuggling and to change criminal procedures; in short, the ruling and opposition parties have to work together.

Refuse to apply the prescriptions which everybody knows -- and indeed on which all are agreed -- and then ask, "Who killed Koksaloglu?"

Surely, you killed him yourself.

8349
CSO: 4907

POPULATION SHIFT SAID TO THREATEN TRADITIONAL PARTIES

Istanbul BUNAYDIN in Turkish 16 Jul 80 p 5

/Article by Teoman Erel: "From Vize to Fatsa"/

/Text/ We are not talking about travel. We are not going to describe the sights on a trip from Vize District /"vize" is Turkish equivalent of "visa"/ in Kirklareli to Fatsa.

The "vize" which is our point of departure is a different "vize." We would like to look into whether there is any connection between our state's attitude toward the unjust conditions placed on Turkish citizens by West Germany and the operation in Fatsa.

The state's reaction to both incidents is abnormal. Adopting an exceptionally soft and conciliatory attitude toward West Germany's visa requirement for Turkish citizens, it has, on the other hand, devised a thunderous operation in Fatsa for the purpose of "proving the existence of the state."

We are experiencing an unhealthy situation like the nervous clerk, reprimanded by his boss but unable to answer back, who beats his children and yells at his wife when he goes home.

The state is the same state. But its outward mildness and deference is matched by internal harshness.

One wonders whether both these abnormal reactions might not stem from the same causes. Is not the feeling of inadequacy manifested now by extreme passivity and again by excessive anger?

Our citizens are living out the drama of an outward migration which has reached large proportions in recent years. Internal and external migration are competing with each other for reasons such as unemployment, growing population, economic crisis, division of property, rising demand and inadequate industrialization.

Emigration has clogged the raods to Europe. Federal Germany no longer wants to take Turks. It is trying to send back those it once welcomed. Emboldened by Turkey's desperate need for German aid, it is demanding a visa without regard to either bilateral agreements or international conventions. Panicking, Turkey takes its crumb and slinks off to a corner.

Now let us talk about internal migration and try to get to Fatsa. You may wonder what connection internal migration has with the Fatsa operation.

What happens when the keepers of the peace panic in the face of rapid urbanization created by internal migration?

Let us go into the matter a little further: What does a system do when it is powerless before "rapid urbanization," one of the most serious phenomena of our time, and does not want to choose the route of democratization and strengthening local administration?

It crack down, reverts to primitive methods...

Urban population has outstripped rural population in our country today. This fact will be made even more striking with the next census. We should not be surprised if before long 100 of the 450 national deputies in the Assembly come from Istanbul and Ankara. Right now Istanbul contains a population the size of Israel's. Or, to be more precise, suffers, not contains. How are these problems to be resolved which this pattern of settlement has brought about? What will be the political effect of having a large protion of the national deputies elected from a few large provinces?

Our nation's traditional political parties are in panic. They are tending toward resolving this problem by reinforcing the central authority instead of democratization and strengthening local administrations.

The JP /Justice Party/ is taking a tough, backward-looking line on this. Let me tell you about the "solution" I heard several weeks ago from a JP national deputy:

"Mayors ought to be appointed instead of elected for a while."

The RPP is not very consistent on this matter either. The RPP passed a law which Koruturk vetoed, but still it excluded the RPP municipalities opposed to the general chairman and JP and NAP /Nationalist Action Party/ municipalities.

The existing order is frightened of the possibility that the parties whose numbers have increased in recent years and the wide variety of opinions would be strengthened in the local administrations and that radical elements would seize control.

In a way, this is a normal reaction. It is a temporary obstacle to be overcome in time. Many municipalities in capitalist Italy and capitalist France today are in the hands of communists and socialists. The electorates in these nations incline to the right in governmental elections, partly through the effect of fine tuning the electoral systems. But in elections of local administrations, there is a greater chance that the people will elect the radical parties which oppose the system. This is probably a safety valve.

We, too, will come to this point. Either right away or slowly and painfully. For a while, we will leave the mayors penniless who have to supply services to the overpopulated cities and we will throw the elected mayors in jail. But, in the end, we will find out the hard way that a nation of 50 million, a society in which more than half of its population lives in the worst organized cities, cannot be governed from a single center.

8349
CSO: 4907

COVERAGE OF DISK CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS

'YANKI' Report

Ankara YANKI in Turkish 7-13 Jul 80 p 22

[Text] The lengthy arguments and the occasional verbal duels during the deliberations on the proposed amendments to the bylaws had already electrified the atmosphere at the DISK [Revolutionary Labor Unions Confederation] congress in Istanbul when Abdullah Basturk added to the tension by declaring, "Now that my proposal has been rejected, I am stepping down from the presidency general." He stalked out of the meeting hall before the incredulous eyes of the delegates. Later, though, Basturk was reelected to the confederation's top office. Polling 416 out of 454 votes, he demonstrated that there was no challenge to his leadership.

On why the DISK congress was moved to an earlier date, Basturk explained, "We took over the administration at a time when unity in the DISK was shattered. We were weak in our political struggle, in our struggle against fascism. That is why, we convened the General Assembly earlier."

At the Sixth DISK Congress 2 1/2 years ago, TCP [Turkish Communist Party] supporters, known as "The Progressivists," were voted out of office, with hopes of forming a closer relationship with the RPP, thereby enhancing the confederation's fighting power. Time has shown that the RPP will not support the confederation under the leadership of Basturk, so long as he maintains his TCP ties. The activity report [submitted to the General Assembly] contained criticism of the TCP, however, citing a number of the party's policies as antidemocratic and undisciplined. The report charged, "That is how that group sabotaged our action and brought about our failure." Basturk was also critical of the TCP. "Two weeks after we took over, they were shouting, 'Long Live the USSR,' and 'Long Live I. Bilen [TCP leader]' to interrupt my speech," he said.

Realizing that the course they were following would not lead them to power, TCP people began to look for alliances, but that did not necessarily mean that they were giving up on Basturk. The DISK leader, his criticism notwithstanding, still agreed with their analyses and did not burn the bridges between the TCP and himself.

Abdullah Basturk, a former RPP deputy, censured both the TCP and the RPP in his replies to the criticism directed at the activities report. He concluded his address, however, by an offer to the RPP. "The RPP and its organs," he said, "DISK is offering you its hand of cooperation in the struggle against fascism, against imperialism. Let us walk together. If you turn us down, it will be your responsibility."

The General Assembly was expected to wind up its work in 5 days, but the vote bargaining extended it to 8 days. Basturk gave two seats to the TCP on the Executive Board, in exchange for Fahmi Isiklar's election as secretary general. Other seats on the board were to go to RPP unionists. Even though the TCP people cast all their votes for their own candidates--Mehmet Kerasa and Metin Denizman--the candidates still could not receive the required majority vote. Basturk, reasoning that he now had all the strings in his hand, declared that "The Progressivists"did not have a single vote. The votes were, in fact, locked. To break the impasse, Basturk had to propose Kemal Daysal of the Maden-Is [Metalware Workers], one of "The Progressivists," as an Executive Board member. Finally, Riza Guven, Mukbil Zirtiloglu, Erten Andac, Suleyman Celebi and Kemal Daysal were elected to the RPP-controlled Executive Board. Meanwhile, the General Assembly decision to move the DISK headquarters to Ankara was interpreted as the pro-RPP people's victory over the TCP.

Meanwhile, the TLP [Turkish Labor Party] and the TSWP [Turkish Socialist Workers Party] people, in a move to boost the changes of the regressivist candidate, had already withdrawn their candidates from the race for the Executive Board; consequently, they had to settle for membership on the Administrative Board.

A dozen unions, three of which were represented on the Administrative Board, held a joint press conference where they described the new DISK leadership as "compromising." Cetin Uygur, chairman of the Yeralti Maden-Is [Underground Mining Workers], Burhan Sahin , chairman of the Basin-Is [Journalists and Press Industry] and Mushin Sahin, president-general of the Dev Maden-Sen[Revolutionary Mining Workers] announced their resignations with the following statement, "We do not consider it an honor to be elected in a general assembly meeting conducted under antidemocratic rules; neither do we wish to be used as a lightning rod in a power struggle that is bound to erupt soon between two concessionary concepts of unionism."

Is it possible to talk of having achieved the sorely needed unity in the DISK when its congress ends with a conciliation between the RPP and the TCP, and unionists, representing other viewpoints, resign and charge that the individuals who provoked DISK's actions in the past 2 1/2 years have been installed in administrative posts?

'AYDINLIK' Report

Istanbul AYDINLIK in Turkish 3 Jul 80 pp 1, 6

[Text] Workers Service--The Seventh General Assembly of the DISK, scheduled to finish its work in 5 days, finally held its elections and adjourned on the 8th day, after a series of behind-the-scenes deals and lengthy bargaining. A TCP member was installed on the RPP controlled Executive Board.

In yesterday's balloting, Ertan Andas, Suleyman Celebi and Kemal Daysal were elected to the three vacant seats on the seven-member Executive Board. Abdullah Basturk announced in a speech before the balloting started that Kemal Nebioglu, Ismet Cantekin and Burhan Sahin had withdrawn from the race. He said he would name three new candidates and asked the assembly to wind up the election business without further delay by giving the new candidates a two-thirds majority in the first round of the voting. Basturk, initially, offered the names of Kemal Daysal of the Maden-Is, Suleyman Celebi of the Tekstil [Textile Workers] and Ahmet Nalbantoglu of the Seramik-Is [Earthenware Industry Workers]. When Nalbantoglu, known as a TLP supporter, withdrew on behalf of Ozcan Kasgac of the Sosyal-Is [Social Services Workers], Basturk returned to the podium and placed the name of Ertan Andas as a candidate, remarking, "This business will simply have to end here." Andas, secretary general of the Genel-Is [Public Services Workers], also serves as the chairman of the General Assembly Council. Andas, then, stepped down from his council seat and joined the assembly delegates. The candidates received the two-thirds majority and were, thereby, elected to the Executive Board when 404 delegates who participated in the election cast 325 votes for Andas, 291 for Daysal and 358 for Celebi.

Other seats on the Executive Board had already been filled in an earlier election which voted Abdullah Basturk as the president general, Fehmi Isikler as secretary general and Mukbil Zirtiloglu and Riza Guven as Executive Board members.

Basturk and Isikler will represent "an ambiguous socialist line," while Zirtiloglu, Guven, Andas and Celebi are known as RPP supporters. Kemal Daysal, on the other hand, is reputedly close to the false TCP.

After Basturk announced the names of his candidates, about 50 delegates from 12 unions submitted a protest motion to the General Assembly, criticizing what they called "a compromise between reformism and unionism, which does not reflect the will of the workers," and walked out of the hall. The group held a press conference outside the hall before leaving for the Basin-Is [presumably the union headquarters]. Represented in the group were Yeraltı Maden-Is, Nakliyat-Is [Transportation Workers], ASIS [Wood Products Workers], Sine-Sen [Movie Industry Workers], Dev Maden-Sen, Dev Saglik-Is [Revolutionary Health Workers], Dev Yapi-Is [Revolutionary Construction Workers], Seramik-Is, Topar-Is [perhaps a new name for TIS, farm workers] and Liman-Is [Dock, Shipyard Workers].

Elections for the Administrative, Supervisory and Honor Boards were held during the afternoon session on the 8th day.

Delegates elected to the Administrative Board were Ekrem Akkus, Ismail Hakki Onal, Nergüzar Can, Durmus Ali Yalniz, Celal Kucuk, Mehmet Kareca, Ridvan Budak, Demirhan Tuncay, Turan Ata, Mustafa Karadayi, Selahattin Sayin, Recep Kec, Yalcin Taleke, Yasar Arikan, Muslim Sahin, Ozcan Kesgec, Cetin Uygur and Burhan Sahin. Meanwhile, Ismail Ozbicer, Talat Oz and Ali Kocaman were elected to the Supervisory Board. The Honor Board was formed by Cemal Arslan, Ergun Erdem, Ismail Caliskan, Osman Ozkan and Saban Aydin.

Council Chairman Ertan Andac, in his address to the closing session of the DISK General Assembly, stressed that misunderstandings, differences and disappointments had to be laid aside. He said, "We must walk arm in arm on the path designated by the General Assembly."

'TERCUMAN' Commentary

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 6 Jul 80 p 9

[Text] Commentary by Refik Sonmezsoy--The Seventh General Assembly of the DISK ended, as predicted, with the victory of the Genel-Is [Public Services] President General Abdullah Basturk who had the support of the largest number of delegates.

On the first day of the congress, a "sham battle" was staged, giving rise to strong suspicions about the existence of an alliance, worked out behind closed doors, between Basturk and RPP leader Bulent Ecevit.

Basturk, who had censured the RPP for taking an anti-DISK stand after it came to power, openly denounced the Moscow-controlled TCP's people, stopping short of calling them what Ecevit had called them in his telegram to the congress, but promised, on the first day of the congress, to exclude from the DISK's administrative body all the people representing the TCP viewpoint.

Armed with Ecevit's message and buoyed by the speech of RPP Secretary General Mustafa Ustundag, who had come over to boost the morale of the pro-RPP delegates, Basturk followed in Vedat Yildiz's footsteps, leading the congress to the direction of his own choice by a variety of deals, ostentatious demonstrations and ultimatums. More significant than that, he ridiculed and played "a cat and mouse game" with the Bank-Sen [Bank and Insurance Workers] leader, Metin Denizman, and Maden-Is President General Kemal Turkler and their teams, representatives of the pro-TCP wing, who had taken a position against him. His conduct demonstrated, in a way, that he had learned a valuable lesson from the late Turk-Is leader, Seyfi Demirsoy.

Basturk came out of the congress victorious, not because he deserved it, or because he would serve workers better than anyone else, but because he

was better at dealing with cliques. All through the congress, he either joined the TCP to put the RPP in its place, or joined the RPP, as he did in the elections, to deliver "a slap in the face" to the overexposed TCP leaders. We predict that the ambitions of Kemal Turkler and his team to take over the administration of the DISK will, henceforth, dim considerably.

Pro-TCP unionists ceded the presidency to Abdullah Basturk on the opening day of the congress and instead turned their attention to winning over the Genel-Is delegates--Basturk's base--to obtain some sort of control over the Executive Board. They came upon Ertan Andac, secretary general of the Genel-Is, who is known as a Basturk opponent. On the day of the balloting for the Executive Board, Basturk announced the names of 10 candidates. The TCP's Mehmet Karaca and Metin Denizman, who also had the RPP votes, polled nearly enough to get on the board. However, when Andac and the RPP people among the Genel-Is delegation withdrew their support from the TCP candidates on the second round of balloting, the TCP men's chances of election was dealt a fatal blow.

When the results of the second round were announced, Metin Denizman, turning to Kemal Turkler by his side, remarked, "Andac sold us out," summing up the development that destroyed the TCP's hopes.

When the balloting resumed after a day's postponement, Andac, a totally unexpected candidate, was elected to the DISK Executive Board upon Basturk's recommendation.

The results of the congress are indications that the confederation will soon set off a new round of bickering in the labor and politics arena. Pro-TCP unionists, who lost out on the upper levels, the Maoist group Kurtulus [Liberation] which could not elect a single member to the executive body, Basturk's promises notwithstanding, and the unionists from the DEV-YOL [Revolutionary Road] and DEV-SOL [Revolutionary Left] factions should be expected to make Basturk and his men pay for that defeat by going into action on the lower levels.

The DISK-RPP alliance will last until a new leftist party is formed. The DISK administration, in the meanwhile, will no doubt have something to say in the bargaining for the RPP chairmanship. The communists and the divisionists in the RPP will receive support, as they always do, from the various leftist factions within the DISK.

As for the Turkish Communist Party in East Berlin, and its Secretary General Ismail Bilen, they will replace the unvictorious Turkler-Denizman team, and should have no difficulty finding new cadres willing to step into the former officials' shoes. Meanwhile, the DISK General Assembly brings no new voice, no new hope to the Turkish worker. Its administration remains in the hands of another communist wing and a pro-RPP clique which expects political benefits from the alliance.

what will happen next. The answer lies in the attitude of certain key men at the DISK which, as the Bank-Sen leader, Metin Denizmen, put it, "has made a habit of selling out itself." [End of commentary]

The Seventh General Assembly of the DISK, which convened between 25 June and 2 July, ended with the victory of the Abdullah Basturk team. From the first day of the congress to the last, Basturk either joined hands with the TCP people to frustrate the RPP wing, or joined the RPP group to cut down the TCP wing. For the elections, Basturk pulled the RPP people to his side and delivered a heavy blow to the unionists known for their TCP links.

The new Executive board has one moderate TCP member, but not a single representative from the Maoist DEV-YOL, Kurtulus, or DEV-SOL factions.

As the congress wound down, Maoist communists had been purged and the RPP unionists, fully aware of the need for cooperation with the TCP, had gained, with TCP support, control of the confederation's administration. The pre-congress plan of the TCP-affiliated unions--the Maden-Is and Bank-Sen, to name a few--to elect a TCP-controlled executive body under the chairmanship of Abdullah Basturk was defeated. The idea that "people without a base cannot remain in the DISK administration" had not worked, even though they had propagated it persistently over the past 3 years. Riza Guven of the Tekstil and Mukbil Zirtiloglu of the OLEYIS [Hotel, Restaurant and Amusement Workers], while they had lost the leadership in their own unions, were reelected to the Executive Board.

Meanwhile, 11 recommendations advanced by the Maoist Kurtulus, and the pro-Albanian DEV-YOL and DEV-SOL, in regards to the DISK's program of activities for the upcoming term, were rejected when the RPP and TCP delegates closed rank against them. Now, the DISK has an administration controlled by the RPP and supported by the TCP. Abdullah Basturk was returned to the presidency general, Fehmi Isiklar became secretary general, and Mukbil Zirtiloglu, Riza Guven, Suleyman Celebi, Ertan Andac and Kemal Daysal were elected to the Executive Board. The political outlooks of these men are as follows:

President General Abdullah Basturk: Served two terms in the National Assembly as an RPP deputy, is also the head of the Genel-Is. Mobilized his union's entire resources to ensure Ecevit's election to the RPP leadership, but subsequently Ecevit cast him aside in the party. May be cooperating with the communists [presumably within the DISK], but not with the East Berlin-based TCP administration. Has adopted the course followed by the communist-controlled French counterpart of the Genel-Is.

Secretary General Fehmi Isiklar: An RPP man and one of the officials in the RPP's Central Workers'Committee.

Mukbil Zirtiloglu: Former president general of the OLEYIS, known as an RPP and Ecevit man.

Riza Guven: Former president general of the Tekstil, an RPP man, was Ismet Inonu's supporter until 1973, and supported Ecevit thereafter.

Ertan Andac: Secretary general of the Genel-Is, member of the RPP's Central Workers' Committee.

Kemal Daysal: A Maden-Is official, known as a TCP man.

Suleyman Celebi: Secretary general of the Tekstil, an ultra leftist.

Notes From the Congress

One of the major decisions that came out of the DISK's Seventh General Assembly was to transfer the general headquarters of the confederation to Ankara. The decision to move to Ankara from Istanbul where the DISK's major strength is may lead to a loosening of the confederation's control over its base. On the other hand, moving to Ankara will free the organization, to a degree, from the ultra leftist militants' persistent pressure and threats. On the opening day of the congress, Basturk, feeling secure in the numerical superiority of his support among the delegates, attacked the East German-based TCP, without actually using the party's name, and made several charges against Maden-Is President General Kemal Turkler and the TCP unionists. The attack and the charges were received favorably by a significant majority of the delegates. His remark, directed at the TCP, "What have you gained by shouting 'Long Live Russia'?" drew prolonged applause from his audience. In the face of Basturk's clear-cut position, Kemal Turkler, having taken over the leadership of the TCP wing, and Metin Denizmen of the Bank-Sen embarked on an all-out behind-the-scenes campaign to get Mehmet Karaca of the TCP wing elected president general. The TCP group achieved a measure of success, until elections though, in their efforts, through Ertan Andac, to win supporters among the Genel-is delegates. The RPP-TCP alliance took a course detrimental to Basturk's plans, but when Basturk, on the fifth day of the congress, delivered his ultimatum on the proposed amendment to the bylaws and walked out, the alliance broke up and the TCP people found themselves all alone. Meanwhile, election of Andac--Basturk's opponent in the Genel-Is--to the Executive Board brought the Andac-TCP cooperation to a quick end. Those moves averted the election of the TCP people--Mehmet Karaca and Metin Denizmen--and the TLP supporter, Burhan Sahin, to the board.

When the balloting started, Basturk's candidate Fahmi Isiklar was elected secretary general by a majority vote. The Basturk-RPP alliance endured until the close of the congress. On the second day of the voting, leftist factions caused an impasse in the election of the five-man Executive Board. Basturk had initially won over the Maoist factions--DEV-YOL, DEV-SOL and Kurtulus--to his side and promised them a seat on the Executive Board, but he subsequently went back on his word, and instead went to work to divide the TCP. He used Kemal Daysal to fracture the TCP unity, and with the same stroke retaliated the Kemal Turkler-led attempt of 2 days ago to divide the Genel-Is delegation. Kemal Daysal, who represents one of the two cliques in the Maden-Is, was elected to the board.

After the TCP was purged from the Executive Board, it was the Maoist faction's turn to be cast aside, which happened on the last day of the congress. Having completed the necessary arrangements, Basturk put up three names for Executive Board membership: Suleyman Celebi, Ertan Andac and Kemal Daysal. Election of the three men by a large majority of votes made it a clean sweep for Basturk, everything had gone his way. The Maoists--Kurtulus, DEV-YOL and DEV-SOL--accused Basturk of revisionism, and 11 unions in the Maoist clique walked out of the congress, vowing to continue their fight within the DISK. The 11 unions were the Yeraltı Maden-Is, Nakliyat-Is, Deri-Is [Leather Industry Workers], As-Sen [Turkish Cypriot Military Employees], Sine-Sen, Devrimci Saglik-Is, Keramik-Is, Dev Maden-Sen, Dev Yapi-Is, Toper-Is [expansion unknown] and Basin-Is.

Conclusion

The outcome of the congress paints a picture that the Basturk team and the RPP unionists in favor of an alliance with the TCP should find very pleasing. By the same token, the developments in the congress are bound to fuel the dispute among the ultra leftist factions within the DISK. We should expect the intensified factional clash to reflect in the DISK's actions in the days ahead and to underline its failures. Meanwhile, what about the RPP people who are scheming to bring the TCP to power, or the people who are for the formation of a new political party, or a merger between the TLP and the TSWP? What will they do? Basturk favors a new political party to enter the 1981 elections to poll the leftist vote outside the RPP. He believes that a new leftist party, with the support of the DISK's tangible and intangible resources, will be represented in the parliament. The TCP people who plan to take over the new party while remaining within the RPP, and the RPP people who see the ultra leftist vote as a stepping stone to power oppose Basturk's efforts to form a new political party. He believe that 1980 which, from all appearances, may well become an election year, will fuel the struggle within the DISK and intensify the clash within the ultra left.

7244
CSO: 4907

ESTABLISHMENT OF SECRET NAP GROUPS IN MILITARY ALLEGED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 10 Jun 80 pp 1, 9

[Statement by Adnan Ozciftci, former student at the Naval Noncommissioned Officer Training School]

[Text] Ankara, 10 Jun--ANKA--It has been alleged that the NAP [Nationalist Action Party] has established secret organizations within the armed forces and that these organizations are holding seminars for students at the military training schools, telling them that a revolution against communism is inevitable.

Adnan Ozciftci, who until his recent resignation was a student at the Naval Noncommissioned Officer Training School, has stated that while a student he had taken an active role in this organization, that when at a later point he had decided to turn his back on the cause, he had been interrogated on 1 June 80 at the NAP's Central Office by three persons, including Mehmed Guclu, a member of our national wrestling team.

In a statement given to members of the press at the Central Office of the TIKP [Turkish Worker Peasant Party] in Ankara, Ozciftci stated that the NAP had established this secret organization within the Naval Noncommissioned Officer Training School, and that he had been appointed leader of the organization in his school.

Responding to a question, Adnan Ozciftci alleged that Abdi Ipekci's assassin M. Ali Agca had been kidnapped by the MIT [National Intelligence Organization], and said that this information had been a topic of conversation among the members of his organization.

Ozciftci continued as follows:

"Within the school the organization functions as five separate groups. The first group is concerned with indoctrination and seminars, and is led by Mizaffer Ozcicek. The second group's responsibility is social activities, its chairman is Rahbi Biyik. The third group is in charge of membership dues, and is led by Mehmed Gokdemir. The fourth group is

charged with propaganda and [its dissemination], and is led by Nedim Yazal. The fifth group [contained] the hit squad, [whose job is intimidation]; it is led by Hidayet Pak. I was the chairman for the organization within the school. Every group consisted of five persons. The aim was to make the Naval Noncommissioned Officer Training School a bastion of the Idealist Commandos, and to put the pressure on leftist students.

We received assistance with our seminars from Erdal and Ulku Apuhan, Idealist Commandos from the third-year class at our school. Following the proclamation of martial law, we [met] a junior officer named Yalcin Karavabbar, who introduced us to Ahmed Karabacak, owner of the Milli Hareket Yayinevi [National Movement Publishing House] in the Bayezit quarter. This bookstore was a meeting place for young officers who had joined the NAP. Officers of various ranks came to our seminars and tried to indoctrinate us with the idea of revolution. By the school year 1979-80 we had gained the upper hand in our school. One day at Karabacak's bookstore I was introduced to Huseyin Bakirci, a student at the Air Force Academy enrolled at Instanbul Technical University. He told me that they had established the organization at their dormitories at Sarayburnu, and that the organization was also active at the Kuleli Military Academy. Second Lieutenant Ener Silsupur, our geography instructor, assisted the organization at our school. Huseyin Bakirci and Mustafa Kiker directed activities at the Naval and Air Force Academies. I met [continually] with Bakirci, and we complained of a lack of funds. I put forward the idea of a holdup, and it was received positively. Muzaffer Cicek, Ismail Kayirsoy, and I decided to rob the Tepebasi Restaurant. We planned to bring weapons in from Antep, and so we left our school on the morning of 26 February. We [met] Bakirci, who telephoned Yilmaz Kurak, deputy chairman of the NAP in Instanbul. Durak came to meet us and advised us against going AWOL, saying that he could supply us with weapons on the spot. Afraid that any weapons he might give us might be tainted, we went AWOL and left for Antep. Because if we were AWOL for 7 days we were going to be expelled, but we resigned on our own to avoid expulsion. At the Kuleli Military Academy the chairman of the organization was a [friend] from class 3-P named Payami. Huseyin Bakirci supplied us with money. He said that if we got expelled he could have us reinstated, that he could provide us with a hiding place if need be, and that he could give us weapons.

AWOL
CHOC AWOL

DANGER SEEN FOR MILITARY IN 'SENSITIVE AREAS' PLAN

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 12 Jul 80 p 7

/Article by Orsan Oymen: "Dangerous Terrorism Contract"/

/Text/ "When this government goes, terrorism is finished."

This was the way Mr Demirel campaigned for the elections last summer. But victims of terrorism during this administration are already approaching 1,900. In the last 1.5 months, 539 people have been killed.

Overall it has reached the proportions of a massive slaughter.

Now the old contractor is more and more crushed under the weight of the contract he bid for.

And what is he thinking about doing?

Turning the terrorism contract over to someone else.

Who?

The army.

You may ask, "Was not terrorism already contracted to the army during the Ecevit administration by way of martial law?"

In a way. But the war on terrorism could be conducted within the framework of martial law statutes by a sort of coalition in the coordination of martial law organs and civilian organs.

Perhaps the administrations were unable to achieve the harmony hoped for because of partisan behavior on the part of state cadres toward civilian administrations, perhaps because they chose the method of going after the flies one by one instead of the real bog of terrorism where the flies breed, or perhaps because of some other reasons.

Demirel is now choosing the route of further expanding the terms of the contract and putting the whole thing on the army "with the rules of military operations and field orders" instead of the laws governing martial law and the principles of the lawful state.

The substance of the reports coming from the "sensitive areas" meeting held at the end of last week under the prime minister's chairmanship in Ankara is this:

"A line will be drawn on the Turkish map from Rize to Iskenderun. The target of the first plan will be the sensitive areas west of the line known as "terrorism nests," nests such as Corum, Celtek, Suluova, Fatsa, Unya and Camas. Then operations will be planned for the areas east of the line where ethnic provocations are concentrated. And finally, they will turn to the large cities."

The plan Demirel has in mind is an extremely dangerous plan. Perhaps the Ozalp tragedy and the Mustafa Muglali events have been wiped from memory by the politicians, but, as often pointed out by the commanders at meetings in Ankara, these tragic events "have not been erased from the pages of history."

Why is the plan dangerous?

It will only serve the purposes of the "terrorists" who dream of bringing the army into confrontation with the public and of the dark powers behind these terrorists.

Let us suppose that the inhabited places known as "sensitive areas" in Fatsa, Siverek, Corum and so forth are surrounded by military units. The army, with all the neutrality and good will in the world, is aiming only for the terrorism nests. Defining these targets and carrying out the operation is not at all like it was on the map at the briefings...because you are not confronted by "an orderly army." Instead, there are provocateurs, terrorist forces, mixed in with the people.

How are you going to fight a war?

By burning the green grass to get at the dry?

By burning the blanket to get rid of a flea?

Then, you will have served the true purposes of those perpetrating terrorism...

Bringing the army into confrontation with the people and casting respect for the army into shadow. And not just in the nation but throughout the Western world, whose train we have boarded.

Perhaps you turn a deaf ear to the reports of such organizations as Amnesty International." You may brush away as untrue their claims that pressure methods are used on people in Turkey and that the principles of human rights are being trampled underfoot.

But we must not forget that Western parliaments, to whom principles such as "human rights and the lawful state" are very important, scrutinize these sensitive points through a magnifying glass in monitoring the economic and military aid they give to Turkey.

We recently mentioned in this column a letter of warning to Foreign Minister Erkmen from Common Market parliamentarians.

We also gave samples from the minutes of "Uncle Hans'" parliament. The sentences taken from these minutes are not only what a national deputy said from the podium, they are also the substance of a bulletin from Schmidt's party chairmanship council.

We would do well to repeat them:

"Turkey receives military aid from us; these supplies, equipment and weapons may be tools in the abuse of human rights in that nation. For these reasons, then, it is our duty to exercise extreme caution. Otherwise, we too will be responsible, even guilty. We demand that the Turkish government be meticulous in its behavior in respect of the principles of human rights. We demand that military aid be used for NATO commitments, not for internal political reasons as a means of applying pressure on the people in areas where social unrest is paramount. The problems in areas of social unrest should be resolved through the realization of social justice instead of military force, and we wish thus to make this known."

You see, don't you?

How the West, to which we have handed our reins, views Turkey which has joined the Western caravan?

And how our government looks?

In its longing to contract terrorism to the army under extremely dangerous circumstances, we wonder if the Demirel government has noticed that it is sawing off the Western limb it climbed out on?

8349
CSO: 4907

BRIEFS

ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FIRM STARTS PRODUCTION--The first radio alarm systems manufactured by ASELSAN (Military Electronic Industry and Trade Corp.) will be delivered to the army and banks today. A ceremony will be held today to celebrate ASELSAN's first delivery. ASELSAN was established 4 years ago with the Foundation for Strengthening the Army's support. There will be a display of the radio, telephone, cipher gear, electronic field telephone, alarm systems, and the digital cryptographic equipment produced by Turkish engineers, technicians, and workers. ASELSAN General Director Hacim Kamoy stated that mass production will begin in a month. He said, "The factory, whose foundation was laid 4 years ago, has started to manufacture. The principle goal of the factory is to reduce to a minimum the country's foreign dependence for defence and promote foreign exchange savings. We have begun working on the establishment of a research and development center to promote the speedy growth of the electronics industry in our country. Plans for the center have been drafted. We hope that the foundation of this facility, which will be an estimated total investment of 300 million lira, will soon be laid. At ASELSAN, vehicles, tanks, and field radios are being produced as well as digital cryptographic gear which will scramble voice communication to prevent telephone conversations from being overheard. Electronic field phones also are being built. Alarm systems that are difficult to disconnect are being developed to prevent bank robberies." [Text] [Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 31 Jul 80 pp 1,9]

CSO: 4907 END

END OF FICHE DATE FILMED

12 Sept 80

DD.